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Abstract
During the height of a political crisis in the late 1980s, hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees crossed
into eastern Ethiopia. A humanitarian crisis soon unfolded as water was in short supply in the arid
region. In response, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) constructed the
largest water system ever built by the agency, with the clear understanding that the Jerer Valley Water
System (JVWS) would be passed on to a local institution.
More than a decade later, with most of the refugees repatriated, the JVWS tenuously exists within the
management jurisdictions of both everyone and no one-between the local, regional, and national
governments and UNHCR. The thesis aims to go beyond simply identifying the shortfalls in
management, but seeks to understand key underlying factors which help drive such failure. Factors
include issues of geopolitics, sovereignty, dependency and space. The Ethiopian state's right to
territorial sovereignty has very significant spatial and planning implications for where refugee camps are
located, how they are built and to what extent public services are shared with the local community. In
the refugee camp studied in this thesis, a heavy dependence on the part of the local community has
formed on the continued existence of Kebribeyah camp, as the space has become a key node of
development for the surrounding community. Thus, while UNHCR attempts to pull out, its efforts are
complicated by the fact that the local, regional and national governments have a deep seated interest in
continued operations of the water system as it is now.
A case is made for greater inclusion of local institutional capacity development in the emergency
response phase (accompanied by the needed funds from international foreign aid) as a means to ensure
a more timely infrastructural management handover.
Thesis Supervisor: Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Ford International Associate Professor of Law and
Development
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Preface
First, the thesis aims to identify and understand the reasons behind failures in management and
handover of the Jerer Valley Water System (JVWS). This goes without saying that as a student, I have
the luxury of evaluating this project in retrospect-a feat significantly easier than actual implementation
in emergency response situations. As an outsider, therefore, I approach this topic with a great deal of
humility. This thesis does not aim to simply identify the shortfalls, but more importantly seeks to
understand the factors behind why the JVWS finds itself in the current state that it is in now.
Second, the incredibly short timeframes in which United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) staff are required to decide, plan and act to address humanitarian crises-as these
relate to provision of water and other basic necessities of life-make it difficult to ensure that all
measures are covered prior to implementation. While as a student of international development, I have
been taught to value the process of long-term planning, this is an amenity not afforded to many when
water needs to be procured for hundreds of thousands immediately.
Third, while failures in management and handover are fully detailed, I approach the situation as
a glass half full rather than half empty. As this thesis will note, the JVWS nevertheless stands as a major
asset to the refugee, local and pastoralist communities and the water coverage rates provided by the
system are far superior to surrounding areas in eastern Ethiopia.
Fourth, I must express that from the year and a half process of researching, interviewing and
writing on the JVWS I have come to firmly believe that the many UNHCR implementers involved in the
process carried out decisions with the best of intentions and acted on those that seemed most logical-
based upon the realities of limited time, personnel, resources and information.
This thesis is a modest attempt at understanding the many elements involved in the challenges
of managing and handing over management of the JVWS, and does so by drawing from literatures and
disciplines of planning, international law, engineering, history, international development and politics.
And I use this thesis as an opportunity to gage how a water system-and infrastructure more
generally-can be passed on from an international actor to a local community-a struggle faced widely
in the international development field.
These are my thoughts. All arguments made in this thesis are based on my own observations unless
otherwise specified.
To my mother, who always encouraged me to reach higher;
and to my father, who always reminded me to keep two feet on the ground.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The Setting: Kebribeyah and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
My dream of working with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had
finally been fulfilled. I was brought on board to work deeply embedded in the field with a UN agency
long celebrated as a first responder to some of the world's most pressing emergencies. The ability to
assess water quality with EC Kits-in-field, bacteriological, water quality tests which require no lab or
electricity and can deliver result within 24 hours-was deeply needed as UNHCR staff were unable to
identify why some camps were experiencing unusually high rates of both crude' and under five-years of
age (U5) diarrheas. Having the capability to do such water quality testing provided me an added sense
of purpose.
However, an assessment trip which I initially anticipated as being narrowly focused, quickly
unfolded into something much wider. A simple, inexpensive and low-tech water quality testing kit to
detect Escherichia coli (E. coli) in drinking water samples served as an entry point into a broader debate
related to resource scarcity-driven conflicts; sovereignty and territoriality over space; the downsides to
decentralized government; the challenges of inter-institutional coordination; aid dependency; and the
long-standing debate between short-term, humanitarian relief and long-term development.
My first deployment was to Kebribeyah, the longest continuously operating camp in Ethiopia,
having been established in January 1991. From the Addis Ababa Head Office, I thought nothing
particularly alarming was occurring there as the water system had been celebrated as a recent success
in infrastructural development. Shortly prior to my arrival in Ethiopia, the Jerer Valley Water System
(JVWS)-noted as the first and most complex water infrastructure project in rural eastern Ethiopia-
underwent its final round of inaugurations with completion of its electrification in late April 2010.
Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, Mr. T. Alexander Aleinikoff inaugurated the infrastructure
during his first trip to Africa as Deputy High Commissioner and is quoted as saying, "This is an innovative
project and a good model," and continued by noting, "It provides an important source of water to the
refugees and also benefits the local community, but is also good for the environment and saves money."
(Hasan and Gebre Eghziabher, 2010)
Just prior to the Deputy High Commissioner's arrival, American actress Jessica Biel and American
musicians Kenna and Santi White-together with Elizabeth Gore, current Executive Director of Global
The crude rate of diarrhea measures the total number of diarrheal occurrences per year per 1000 individuals.
Partnerships at the United Nations Foundation (UNF)-visited Kebribeyah and noted its success three
days after summiting Mount Kilimanjaro. Furthermore, I considered other camps with comparatively
higher rates of crude and U5 diarrheas to be more of a pressing issue. However, after accompanying
Addis Ababa Head Office staff to the UNHCR Jijiga Field Office for an annual assessment meeting from
June 15-16, 2010, some serious contradictions began to dawn on me.
Our flight from Addis Ababa to Jijiga was brief, with few passengers aboard aside from staff
working for UN agencies and non-government organizations-be they local, national or international.
The Soviet aircraft descended onto Jijiga's airstrip, newly laid with tarmac. The airport 'terminal' was a
lonely tin shack situated in the middle of a wind-swept field, covered in desperately-thirsty brown grass
waiting for the season's first rains. After being zipped to the Field Office in Toyota Land Cruisers
(generously donated by the Japanese government), the annual meeting soon began. Implementing
partners (IPs) talked up their deliveries on contracted responsibilities, while noting how they've gone
above and beyond in some instances. During this time, however, some tension was clearly seething
beneath the surface; but I couldn't quite pinpoint what it was. Minor arguments and accusations were
passed around at times, but related to what exactly was difficult to discern.
The meeting felt like an urban planning meeting at its extreme, with all topics related to refugee
livelihoods covered-ranging from the basics of food and water, to housing, site planning, gender
mainstreaming, future camp expansions, education, healthcare and safety. The assessment served as a
crash course on how work gets done in refugee camps, with local, national and international NGOs
functioning like private firms who've secured contracts to carry out certain tasks. Different NGOs take
on different responsibilities within each camp-some do sanitation here, the same do education there,
while the Ethiopia Administration of Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) acts as both overall camp
administrator and implementing partner-securing various contracts primarily focused on healthcare.
During discussions over Kebribeyah, a woman refugee representative noted the water supply
drawn from the JVWS was intermittent. A representative from the UNHCR Head Office in Addis Ababa,
along with Jijiga Field Office Staff diplomatically indicated their knowledge of some inter-institutional
coordination conflicts existing around the JVWS. The Head Office representative mentioned a need to
investigate the allegation of an inconsistent supply. And so, after the close of meetings and subsequent
site visits to the project, the whole conflict surrounding the water system became apparent.
2 In an effort to raise awareness and money for global freshwater shortages, the Summit on the Summit raised money partially to support
UNHCR water supply initiatives.
The Nut and Bolts of the Jerer Valley Water System (JVWS)
The History of the System
Originally comprised of just a series of boreholes drilled to supply a massive influx of Somali
refugees in the late 1980s, the Jerer Valley Water System (JVWS) produced water to be trucked to Harti
Sheik. As the world's largest refugee camp throughout much of the 1990s, Harti Sheik had a population
of roughly 250,000 refugees-out of a total of more than 628,000 refugees housed in eight camps.
(Ambroso 2002) However, Harti Sheik lacked a major local source of water. And as the exorbitant cost
of tankering water (estimated at US $10 per cubic meter) was draining UNHCR funds, it was decided to
construct piped water infrastructure as a cost-saving measure.
By 1999, ground was broken for the first phase of a major water pipeline to link the boreholes to
Harti Sheik-with the projected number of beneficiaries at more than 220,000 refugees and close to
25,000 local residents. As the closest camp (20 km away), Kebribeyah would be the initial terminus of
the pipeline from the boreholes, with water stored in two tanks that would eventually feed a gravity-
flow pipeline connected to Harti Sheik (an additional 20 km away). While UNHCR sought the funds to
continue pipeline expansion from Kebribeyah, water would be tankered for the remaining journey;
nevertheless, the initial expansion reduced tanker trips in half thereby significantly cutting costs. When
the first phase was completed in March 2004, the JVWS stood as UNHCR's single largest water
investment in its history. (UNHCR March 2004) However, in parallel with the pipeline's construction,
camps were closing down as refugees began to repatriate to Somaliland with improvement in the
security situation. The massive numbers of refugee beneficiaries was short-lived as Harti Sheik and all
but one of the eastern camps were closed by June 2004. Those few who remained out of fear to return
(15,780 individuals) were consolidated in Kebribeyah, while Harti Sheik essentially became a vacant lot.
However, the JVWS was not without significant amounts of beneficiaries-even with the mass
repatriation of refugees. A number of local residents-particularly town and pastoralist Ethiopian
nationals in Kebribeyah woreda3-came to rely on JVWS as it filled a major service gap in an arid region
suffering from frequent drought. Shortly after plans were drafted in September 1999, rains were failing,
livestock were dying off in droves and a humanitarian crisis was arising in the Somali region as reports of
famine and malnutrition became widespread. (Office of the UN Resident Coordinator 1999)
3 A governmental management unit equivalent to a district. A woreda is comprised of a collection of kebeles.
Kebribeyah
Somali (KBR) and
Year Refugee Event Harti Sheik Local
Population (HSK) Population
in Camps Camp
Population
More than 600,000 Somali refugees enter Ethiopia, fleeing civil war Roughly
1988* More than violence in Somalia* 400,000
Drilling of borehole wells in Jerer Valley begins refugees (HSK)
Siad Barre regime collapses in January 1991
Somaliland declares independence on May 18, 1991 250,926 (HSK)
' Drought sparks humanitarian crisis (famine, malnutrition) in Ogaden + 12,584 (KBR)
Kebribeyah camp opens.
51,317 (HSK) + 8,840 (town)
1997 249,235 Voluntary repatriation program launched 11,097 (KBR) + 15,990
(pastoralists)
1998 195,300 Tensions rise and 2 CARE International water tanker drivers killed 31,372 (HSK) +11,097 (KBR)
Phase 1 begins: pipeline connection between borehole wells and
Kebribeyah 29,535 (HSK) +
1999 180,862 Plans drafted for pipeline connecting Kebribeyah and Harti Sheik 11,622 (KBR)
Drought sparks humanitarian crisis (famine, malnutrition) in Ogaden
Phase 1 complete: pipeline connection between borehole wells and 10,320 (KBR) +
2004 16,470 Kebribeyah, March 2004 2,500 (HSK)
Harti Sheik closes June 2004
2005 15,901 Consolidation of Somali refugees in Kebribeyah, the last remaining 15,780 (KBR)
eastern camp
2006 16,576 16,399 (KBR)
Renewed fighting in southern Somalia in June 2006 leads to influx of 11,481
2007 25,843 refugees and re-opening of previously closed camps. Kebribeyah camp 16,879 (KBR) (town) +
population remains stable. 19,806(pastoralists)
2008 33,625 16,132 (KBR)
2009 58,980 Drought sparks humanitarian crisis (famine, malnutrition) in Ogaden 16,496 (KBR)
13,192
2010 55,200 Phase 2 complete: electrification of Jerer Valley Water System (JVWS) 16,556 (KBR) (town) +19,806
(pastoralists)
*The massive influx of refugees throughout the late 1980s makes it difficult to tabulate exact numbers. 1991 was the first year a concerted count was
conducted.
Source: UNHCR Statistical Data, UNHCR Country Fact Sheets, UNDP Country Reports, Ethiopia Central Statistical Agency, Guido Ambroso 2002
................
Environmental degradation was a constant challenge faced
g athroughout the 1990s, with devastating droughts reported in
1991 and early 2000.
Growing population pressures on scarce water
resources produced conflict between local town-dwelling and
pastoralist communities and refugees, thereby requiring
UNHCR to share the drilled water with Ethiopian nationals.
Tensions peaked in 1998, when pastoralists repeatedly
INDIAN blockaded water tankers-demanding that water drawn from
RWAND OCEANA
Pn their sovereign territory be shared. Two CARE International
drivers were killed on claims of injustice that refugees were
Source: Economis 200 enjoying water while the herds of local pastoralists died of
thirst around them. Thus, the shared system came to embody
a godsend for the local communities and created an incentive for the system's continued operation. A
more recent drought in 2009 further hinged local survival on the JVWS.
Electrification of the water system in 2010 raised the project's total price tag to US $5 million
serving a total population of 49,554 (16,556 refugees, 13,192 town residents and 19,806 pastoralists),
but enabled more savings on operation costs. Shifting from use of diesel to electricity to fuel pumps
also made the supply more consistent as failure of the local operator to consistently service the pumps
led to frequent water outages. In all, a combination of funding sources was tapped to finance the
construction of the system which included a combination of multilateral, bilateral, regional and private
sector sources: UNHCR, UNICEF, UNF, the Italian government, the Somali Regional Water Resources
Bureau and Nestl6-the Swiss food and beverage giant. However, while fees are issued for users of the
systems (particularly pastoralists within a 75 km radius during the dry seasons) operations and
maintenance have been and continues to be financed by UNHCR alone.
The Physical Infrastructure
A detailed summary of the infrastructural components of the JVWS itself is as follows, with an overview
of the water's journey from source to jerrycan.
(1) Source: The JVWS draws groundwater from an underground aquifer through seven borehole wells
located in a well-field which stretches three km in length. The deepest well is close to
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Figure 1-4: Water Treatment Facility at Qaaho kebele
C D
A Aeration B Coagulation / Flocculation C Sedimentation D Chlorination
250 meters deep. As the raw water in the boreholes is devoid of oxygen and contains a high
concentration of carbon dioxide, only stainless steel submersible pumps are utilized to extract
water. Riser pipes are made from either stainless steel or PVC. Upon extraction, water is
transported to the treatment facility in 200 mm diameter PVC carrier pipes embedded in concrete.
(2) Treatment Plant: Groundwater passes through the standard procedure of treatment which includes:
aeration, coagulation / flocculation, sedimentation and chlorination. Given the relatively low
turbidity and high microbial quality of the raw water, filtration is unnecessary. Two gravity aerators
release carbon dioxide and oxidize the relatively high concentration of dissolved iron, while
oxygenating the raw water to improve taste and softness. The newly aerated water falls into a
coagulation chamber where aluminum sulfate is applied as a coagulant (at a suggested dose of 40
mg/liter). Resultant flocs are partially removed upon settling into the sedimentation basin and are
fully removed after drifting the 17.8 meter distance along a 2% slope. Granular hypochlorite
(chlorine powder) is then applied at a suggested dosage of 2.0 mg / liter (assuming 70% active). On
average, about 2375 meters3 of treated water are produced at the facility daily.
(3) Pumping and Booster Stations: At the treatment plant site in Qaaho kebele4 , a pumping station
pumps water 11 km uphill to a booster pumping station in Gedhune kebele. The treated water
makes the additional 9 km uphill journey to three tanks located at the "Atlas Compound" in
Kebribeyah kebele. The difference in elevations between Qaaho and Kebribeyah is roughly 350
meters. When previously fueled by diesel, the two generators consumed an average of 30 liters per
4 A neighborhood association, which is the smallest unit of local governance in Ethiopia.
...... ....... ---- -------- --- -
hour each when operating for 12 hours (of a maximum suggested total of 20 hours) daily. It was
estimated that the pumping station generators would consume 720 liters per day. Electrification
therefore drove down operations costs significantly and improved regularity of water supply as
pilfering by utility staff was reduced and the energy supply was better guaranteed.
(4) Storage Tanks: Three covered storage tanks (75,000 liters capacity each) are situated at the main
highway in Kebribeyah kebele, making up the "Atlas Compound." The story behind the name is
unknown. Originally comprised of two tanks (with space allocated for a potential third), one tank
served as a storage point for tankers distributing water to Harti Sheik. In initial project designs, one
tank was allocated for piped distribution into Kebribeyah kebele and camp. Following the shelving
of plans to extend a pipeline to Harti Sheik an additional tank was constructed. Currently one tank is
allocated to the refugee camp, one to the kebele and one to the surrounding pastoralist
communities.
(5) Public Service Tapstands: The distribution system initially consisted of 17 tapstands in Kebribeyah
kebele, while seven tapstands were constructed within Kebribeyah camp. In an aim to have no
household situated more than 200 meters from a distribution point, successive expansions have
grown this number to more than 20. Most recent data suggests that 65% of refugees live within 200
meters of a water point (with the UNHCR standard at 100%), while a useable tap exists for every 180
persons. (UNHCR Standards Report
2008) Between 73-262 kebele
households' enjoy household
connections, (Ethiopia Central
Statistical Agency 2007) constructed
and financed by the households
themselves. A pastoralist gravity-
fed pipeline was built with UNHCR
financing and includes 20 public
tapstands and livestock troughs.
(6) Jerrycans: Within the refugee camp,
primarily women and children Somali refugee women collecting water from a public tapstand with 20 liter
collect from public tapstands and jerrycans.
Average household sizes for the Somali region are 6.5 persons per household. (Ethiopia Central Statistical Agency 2007)
............. I  .  - - .... .......... .  ...... -- -  ... . .... . .......................... .   .
store water at the household level in 20 liter jerrycans. It is suggested that safe storage containers
be narrow-necked to reduce chances of contamination, and they should be stored indoors in cool
and dark locations for no more than a 24 hour period. Such a measure helps ensure continued
quality of the water as chlorine residual degrades over time. While each household is entitled to
jerrycans within their yearly rations, jerrycans are generally distributed based upon availability of
funds. And as UNHCR aims to ensure that each individual enjoys 20 liters of water per day to meet
drinking, cooking, sanitation and hygiene needs, on average, individuals obtained 15 liters per day.
(UNHCR Standards and Indicators Report 2008)
The Institutional Infrastructure
A detailed summary of the management hierarchy and institutional responsibilities are summarized in
Figures 1-5 and 1-6, followed by a brief history of how the institutional coordination arrangement came
to be.
Figure 1-5: Water Management Table
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Distribution Maintenance /
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A Water Tank
Management /
Collection of Fees
KO~rbeya Watr DskKVD
Distribution
(camp)
I Distribution
(kebele)
P Sovereign - Constituent Relations
4"--) Institutional Partnership
----- > Water Procurement Responsibility
. .............
Adr, nistIratin f Regee ad
Returnee Affairs JARRAii
a
7-
6-
7 KobelloUsers, (Urban)
Fgr-6 Intttoa Repniblte of al Actr in th -e alyWtrSse J )Mngmn
OranztinA.enc Are ofRsosblte ouainSre
S ~ cl Jurisdiction - .
United Nations High Supranational Kebribeyah o Financing overall operations and o Refugees (Somali
Commissioner for refugee camp maintenance of the JVWS nationals) and by
Refugees (UNHCR) o General oversight of the JVWS circumstance, the
o Provider of technical expertise and kebele and
knowledge pastoralist
communities.
Administration of Federal Kebribeyah o Water procurement in camp o Refugees
Refugee and Returnee refugee camp o Maintenance, expansion and (Somali nationals)
Affairs (ARRA) construction of infrastructure in
camp
Somali Regional Regional Boreholes and o Board member of the Kebribeyah o Region's rural
Water Resources rural areas Water Desk residents
Bureau along the JVWS (generally) and
pipeline pastoralist
community
(specifically)
Jijiga Water Supply Woreda Jijiga woreda o Maintenance of water o Refugee, kebele
Office (JWSO) (and infrastructure and pastoralist
contracted to o Management and operations of communities
operate and water facility (boreholes,
maintain the treatment facility, pumping
JVWS) stations)
Kebribeyah Water Woreda Kebribeyah 0 Water procurement in woreda and o Ethnic Somali
Desk (KWD) woreda the Jerer Valley pastoralist line. nationals of
o Management and operation of Ethiopia residing
Atlas Compound tanks in woreda
o Maintenance, expansion and
construction of infrastructure in
woreda
o Collection of water tariffs in kebele
Water Management Water Point Pastoralist 0 Collection of water tariffs from o Pastoralists
Committees tapstands pastoralist tapstands
(pastoralists) 0 Maintenance and management of
pastoralist tapstands
Water Management Water Point Refugee o Maintenance and management of 0 Refugees
Committees tapstands refugee tapstands
(refugees)
The arrangement detailed above is the result of more than ten years of negotiations between
UNHCR and the local, regional and national governments. Yet, not a single entity maintains full financial,
operational and maintenance control of the JVWS. Even within specific activities (such as water
distribution), responsibilities are divided between multiple actors based upon spatial jurisdiction. Like
water itself, the JVWS travels through and across political boundaries while tying together jurisdictions
of varying institutional scales. The actors involved with each activity are detailed as follows:
.1 ..... .. ........... -........... - --  . ...............
(1) Financing (UNHCR and KWD):6 While tariffs are collected based upon water usage and meter
readings, the fees do not cover all operational and maintenance costs. UNHCR fills the budgetary
gap. Officially, the Kebribeyah Water Desk (KWD)-the woreda's local water utility-is responsible
for collection and management of all finances. Currently, KWD collects water tariffs directly from
kebele residents, while Water Management Committees collect water tariffs from pastoralist users7
meant to be passed onto KWD. UNHCR pays for refugee water usage.
(2) Water Treatment and Maintenance (JWSO): Maintenance of borehole wells, treatment of water and
infrastructural repairs and improvements are subcontracted to the Jijiga Water Supply Office (JWSO).
While a public water utility of Jijiga, the neighboring woreda and the Somali regional capital, JWSO
retains an operations and maintenance contract with UNHCR due to its technical capabilities which
KWD lacks.
(3) Distribution (JWSO, KWD and ARRA): Water distribution is divided between three actors. JWSO is
responsible for transportation of water from the treatment facility through the booster pumping
station up until it reaches the Atlas Compound's tanks. The three tanks are managed by KWD who is
responsible for maintaining adequate water levels within the tanks as well as opening respective
gate valves during distribution times (8am - 12pm and 2pm - 5pm). Once water flows into gravity-
fed mains linked to the kebele, pastoralist communities and refugee camp, KWD is responsible for its
distribution into the former two, while the Administration of Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA)8
is responsible for distribution into the latter.
(4) Water Point Management (Water Management Committees): While pastoralist tapstands are
managed by Water Management Committees, refugee tapstands are managed by a tapstand
attendant. Generally a female refugee, a tapstand attendant is assigned to each tapstand within
Kebribeyah camp and paid for her services by UNHCR through ARRA. A tapstand attendant's terms
of reference includes: (1) opening water points during distribution times, (2) cleaning and
maintaining the tapstands, (3) expressing to ARRA when tapstand hardware is in need of repair, (4)
overseeing responsible use of tapstands and (5) effectively controlling crowds during collection
times.
6 While KWD is meant to be a solvent entity, multiple interviews with UNHCR staff, NGO staff and refugee residents note that the KWD staff is
highly corrupt and that collected fees rarely make it into the KWD operations budget.
Pastoralist communities are generally organized around water points, with Water Management Committees assigned to each tapstand and
drawing its members from the surrounding community. During the dry seasons, pastoralists from up to a 75 km radius come to the water
points to water their herds. Fees are charged by Water Management Committees per head of livestock.
8 ARRA is a federal ministry initially established in 1988 to manage the close to one million refugee influx in 1988. While a government ministry
and overall manager of camp operations, it also operates as a subcontractor with a number of responsibilities within the camp-among them
healthcare and organizing tapstand attendants.
The intricacies of this arrangement are complex and comprise of a number of overlaps and gaps. As
will be detailed in Chapters 3, this extensive web of relations is a result of multiple UNHCR negotiations
with the local community and the national government, resulting in the JVWS dwelling within the
jurisdictions of both everyone and no one. And, while this network of responsibilities has allowed for
the JVWS to more-or-less function on the day-to-day, the likelihood of handing over management from
UNHCR to KWD seems distant-despite repeated expectations that a handover would occur rapidly
since completion of the JVWS's first phase in 2004.
When the pipeline connecting Qaaho and Kebribeyah was completed, it was assumed that the
expanded JVWS would be handed over "shortly" to the local authorities. (UNHCR March 2004) While
originally intended to be passed on to the Somali Regional Water Resources Bureau, the Bureau pulled
out when it became apparent that operations and maintenance of the JVWS would amount to their
entire annual budget. Nevertheless, in the initial planning phases of the system (before ground was
broken), tens of thousands of refugees in Harti Sheik and Kebribeyah were in need of water while water
transport costs needed to be brought down and kebele and pastoralist angers had to be placated over
the fact that water was not being shared. UNHCR therefore decided to create the Kebribeyah Water
Desk (KWD), which was designated to receive full management and operational responsibilities of the
JVWS when deemed ready-as no other partner was willing to take on its responsibility.
In an effort to best enable this handover, UNHCR exercised a number of measures: the agency
lined up all funding for the system's construction; KWD was created to promote local management of
the water resource; technical staff were hired and paid for by UNHCR to operate, manage and most
importantly, capacitate the local leadership; and Water Management Committees were organized
around pastoralist tapstands, to manage and maintain the water points as well as collect fees. It was
expected that KWD would have the capability and capacity to take on full management by "the end of
2004." (UNHCR March 2004) By 2007, however, the water project was still not handed over, with clear
expression of "concerns for the long-term future of the water system." (UNHCR February 2007)
The combination of ageing pumps and equipment as well as widespread pilferage of diesel
caused service interruptions and a reduction in pumping capacity to just 50 percent of the boreholes'
maximum potential. UNHCR therefore committed to continue its support of the JVWS by committing to
"building their [KWD's] managerial capacity to take over and manage the scheme," said Fernando Protti
Alvarado, then UNHCR's deputy representative to Ethiopia. Mr Protti is further quoted as saying,
There is also a need for further discussions and negotiations and hard work to get a proper and
sustainable management system in place. Failure in this endeavor will have a serious impact on
the overall refugee assistance at Kebribeyah camp, and the local communities who benefit from
the scheme. (UNHCR February 2007)
Despite such resolve, the site visit on June 16, 2010 came to show that the JVWS continued to be far
from ready for a handover. The system remains in a nebulous grey area-waiting to be fully managed
by one entity or another. And, KWD's failure in demonstrating management capability became all the
more apparent during the UNHCR assessment visit.
The Initial Site Visit
On June 16, 2010, UNHCR Head and Field staff, along with ARRA officials and NGO implementing
partners (IPs), left Jijiga in a convoy of Toyota Land Cruisers-similar to a wedding procession. Upon
entering Kebribeyah woreda, one immediate first impression was the difficulty in differentiating the
refugees from the locals and vice versa. Not only are both communities ethnically Somali, speaking the
same language, wearing the same clothes and many times being from the same clans; but more
significantly, their respective settlements melded and blurred into each other-with a bustling market at
the confluence of the two. And like the water system, the refugees and local residents flow between
jurisdictions-irrespective of the sovereignties they both cross from and into-accessing the shared
healthcare and education facilities.
While the convoy grouped at the ARRA
compound in Kebribeyah, Somali refugee
women were loading an International
Organization of Migration (IOM) bus with
themselves and their suitcases. The day was a
big day as these women were going to nearby
Dire Dawa for their resettlement interviews to
the United States. The resettlement process
had been ongoing very gradually since June
2008, under the invitation of former US
President George W. Bush. By June 2010,
2258 families (8513 individuals of the total Somali refugees en route to resettlement interview
camp population of 16,556) were referred to the UNHCR Resettlement Hub (Nairobi)-a near definite
signifier that they had passed screenings for resettlement in the United States.
. ............................ . .. . . . ..  .......
Left: The Atlas Compound's three tanks for each respective community; Right: Pastoralist woman collecting water from a puddle.
After as many as 19 years as refugees, this marked a moment many had been long waiting for. At the
same time, 3113 families (8043 individuals) continued to wait for an interview. As I took a picture of the
refugees during their moment, a driver had mentioned a misfortune; while the entire camp was eligible
for resettlement, more refugees than expected were failing to pass the screening interviews. Many
would remain in an indefinite limbo within the camp as their claims of fear of return allowed them to
stay; but their ability to be resettled in the United States (or another third country) remains unknown.
After touring the school, the healthcare facility, the children-friendly space and the general
camp premises, the convoy made its way to the Atlas Compound. The grounds were overgrown while
the gate was in need of mending. Almost immediately upon surveying the premises, an older gentleman
approached a senior level UNHCR staff member based in Jijiga; the older gentleman was the woreda
leader, both uninvited and unexpected. With anger in his voice and desperation in his gesticulations, he
implored the UNHCR and ARRA representatives to please do something. Pastoralists had stormed his
office, demanding that something be done with the water system. Their herds remained thirsty as the
taps dripped dry-something which should not be occurring as sufficient amounts of water were being
produced by the boreholes supplying the system.
A UNHCR water engineer took a look around the facility to understand the cause of the problem.
Upon surveying the pastoralist reservoir, it was apparent that KWD had failed to open the gate valve to
feed the gravity-flow pipe leading to the pastoralist community. The kebele and refugee tanks were
reaching near empty. As the engineer began opening the gate valve, the woreda leader was blaring,
telling the visiting UNHCR and ARRA staff that this was not a one-time occurrence and consistently
happened on a regular basis. It was not a matter of water scarcity; rather, KWD was failing to properly
........... I ....... .................... --- -- .  ....  .
manage and operate the system-and, effectively destroying the infrastructure according to some. I
was stunned. I had thought I could rationalize the motivations, but this situation defied reason. No
doubt, ineptitude was one possible explanation; but moreover, there appeared to be a serious lack of
incentive to manage the system properly as something so simple as opening a gate valve was not being
done. The likely reasons behind this failure will be discussed in Chapter 4. While the books in
Cambridge had taught me of the benefits and strengths of decentralized, locally managed water systems,
the JVWS stood as an example where local management was proving ineffective.
A senior staff member from Jijiga could hardly control herself at that point; and with good
reason. Pastoralists along the line were not receiving water-in a location where surface water is scarce
and such a pipe serves as a lifeline to sustain their herds. Pulling aside the near adolescent manager of
KWD-dressed in over-sized blazer and baggy jeans which consistently fell from his waist-she
screamed, "We want to pass this system onto you!" It did not matter that the young man couldn't
understand English; she could hardly control herself from expressing her frustration. "We won't be here
forever. You need to start taking responsibility now!"
Guiding Questions for the Thesis
As the woreda leader had duly mentioned, the JVWS was not being properly managed by the
implementing partners responsible for treatment and procurement. Chapter 2 begins by covering the
initial premise of my visit to Kebribeyah-the assessment of the quality and quantity of Kebribeyah
camp's water supply-and notes there is strong indication that insufficient amounts of chlorine are
applied at the treatment facility, while an inconsistent water supply has had serious public health and
social ramifications for the camp residents. However, the chapter also discusses the fact that the
system is a major resource for the refugee, local and pastoralist communities, regardless. And while not
necessarily looking to affix blame on one actor or another, the thesis rather seeks to answer what factor
are driving this failure in management and handover.
UNHCR has actively tried to set in place a number of measures to ensure sound management
and eventual handover of the water system to the local community, yet Chapter 3 posits whether
certain unavoidable challenges related to history and sovereignty are contributing to the water system's
failure. More specifically, the chapter seeks to answer why a number of guidelines explicitly detailed in
the UNHCR Emergency Handbook were not taken into account during the initial planning of Kebribeyah
camp and the JVWS. Chapter 4 moves the discussion to the spatial implications of refugee camps
generally and how this may have helped create a strong dependence on UNHCR's continued presence in
Kebribeyah-thereby complicating the agency's efforts in pulling out. UNHCR refugee protection work
often times requires the agency to implement development interventions in local communities; and
Chapter 4 therefore questions whether it is better for all actors (including UNHCR) involved if agency
actively took on an additional role of international development-which would entail increased focus on
local institutional capacity building. Such action will ultimately better enable a management handover
to the local community as capacity and capability will exist.
Finally, in Chapter 5, the thesis questions whether the modalities of international foreign aid
itself are contributing to the difficulties in transitioning from relief to development-signified in a
management handover of the JVWS from a UN agency to a local community competent and willing to
take on the responsibility; and if so, can the dynamics of aid somehow be changed to ensure that if and
when UNHCR pulls out of Kebribeyah that the locally-managed water system will be solvent and capable
of procuring a clean and consistent water supply?
Chapter 2: A Comparative Analysis of Water Service Provision across Scales
Despite the problems noted during the site visit, the Jerer Valley Water System (JVWS)
nevertheless stands as a very significant asset to the refugee camp and surrounding town and pastoralist
communities. Before understanding the shortfalls of water provision-in relation to water quality and
supply-it is first important to understand the JVWS in the context of rural Ethiopia, and more
specifically the rural Somali Region. The system stands as a linchpin for survival in a region affected by
increasingly frequent droughts and provides access to drinking water on levels which are comparatively
higher than others not within proximity of the system.
Nevertheless, while the system stands to do so much good for the refugee, local and pastoralist
communities it suffers from shortfalls relative to poor water quality and an intermittent supply. Recent
electrification of the JVWS has been noted to significantly improve regularity of the water supply. But,
the continued existence of specific shortfalls has very real ramifications which increase the public health
and social risks (specifically with relation to violence) of refugee beneficiaries. And, while a challenging
environment itself, it is important to note that the JVWS suffers from shortfalls not experienced in other
camps. Water quality data analysis comparing Kebribeyah to three other camps (AwBarre, Sherkole and
Shimelba) helps lead to this conclusion. And ultimately, what will be noted is that the current
institutional arrangement regarding service has resulted in a situation in which it is difficult to affix
liability to a single responsible actor, as management of the system is within the jurisdictions of
everyone-and to that effect, no one.
A Glass Half Full
First and foremost, it is important to indicate
that no other water system on this scale exists within W S i
Area 1990 1995 2000 2005 200
the entire Kebribeyah woreda. The United Nations Nationwide 17 22 28 35 38
Statistics Division (Figure 2-1) notes that in Ethiopia as Urban 77 82 88 95 98
.Rural 8 12 18 24 26
a whole, only 8% of the population in rural regions
had access to an "improved drinking water source" 9  Source: UN Statistics Division, 2008 * based on UN estimation
in 1990 (the time of the Somali refugee influx), 12% around the time of mounting tensions between the
9 The World Health organization (WHO) classifies a household connection, public standpipe (tap stand), protected dug well, protected spring
and rain water collection as examples of an "improved drinking water source."
s
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pastoralists and refugees over scarce water resources in 1995, and 24% by the completion of Phase 1 of
the JVWS in 2005. Most recent estimates in 2008 show this percentage has increased to 26%. (United
Nations Millennium Development Indicators, 2008) While these statistics speak to progress made in
Ethiopia in expanding improved drinking water sources over the past 28 years, it must be noted that the
Somali Region especially has suffered from comparatively lower levels of water provision. Moreover,
given the ultimate goal of clean water for all, 28% falls far short.
Due to repeated international and civil conflict-as well as its generally peripheral location-
Kebribeyah has suffered from comparatively lower levels of water service development. In Figure 2-3,
Kebribeyah woreda's coverage of "improved water sources" is compared to the Nation, the Somali
Region, the Jijiga Zone as well as with neighboring Jijiga woreda (location of the regional state capital
and most economically developed city in the region).10
Figure~~ ~ ~~ 2-2 Ma. of 0tipa rlvntonrfgecmsadpcsofjisin
10 One will note a slight difference in statistics as these figures draw from the 2007 data collected by the Ethiopia Central Statistics Agency.
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Area Population Taps Protected Well or Unprotected well or spring /Spring river, lake or pond
Ethiopia 73,750,932 4,339,741 29 2,527,493 17 8,235,900 55
Ethiopia urban 11,862,821 2,481,784 86 172,285 6 242,949 8
Ethiopia Rural 61,888,111 1,857,957 15 2,355,208 19 7,992,951 65
Somali Region 4,445,219 77,790 12 92,704 14 478,047 74
Somali Region Urban 623,004 43,106 47 10,991 12 37,415 41
Somali Region Rural 3,822,215 34,684 6 81,713 15 440,902 79
Jijiga Zone 967,652 29,292 20 30,886 21 85,161 59
Jijiga Zone urban 203,588 24,676 71 4,196 12 5,756 17
Jijiga Zone rural 764,064 4,616 4 26,690 24 79,405 72
Jiiga Woreda 277,560 22,954 54 5,996 14 13,821 32
Jijiga Woreda urban 125,876 21,126 91 964 4 1,174 5
Jijiga Woreda rural 151,684 1,828 9 5,032 26 12,647 65
Kebribeyah Woreda 165,518 2,275 9 6,743 26 16,466 65
Kebribeyah urban 25,493 1,645 40 713 17 1,764 43
Kebribeyah rural 140,025 630 3 6,030 28 14,702 69
Source: Ethiopia Central Statistics Agency, 2007
Figure 2-3 details the general level of underdevelopment related to Kebribeyah's drinking water
infrastructure. A more detailed breakdown of drinking water source data can be referred to in Appendix
2. Some key differences identified from the consolidated data are as follows:
e 46% of Ethiopian households have access to improved water resources versus 26% of the Somali
Region, 41% of the Jijiga Zone and 35% of the Kebribeyah woreda.
When "protected wells or springs" are eliminated from the comparison, and just taps are compared:
* 29% of Ethiopian households have access to taps [tap inside house, tap in compound (private), tap
in compound (shared), tap outside compound] versus 12% of the Somali Region, 20% of the Jijiga
zone and 9% of Kebribeyah woreda.
* With relation to taps, the entire Kebribeyah woreda as well as Kebribeyah urban and Kebribeyah
rural areas, significantly trail behind the nationwide, region-wide and zone-wide coverage as well as
in comparison to Jijiga woreda.
Kebribeyah's comparatively lower rates of improved water source coverage-and specifically of
taps-further stresses the value of the JVWS. These comparatively lower percentages makes it highly
.......... ..................................... .  ... . ........ I ....... . ..........
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likely that the water services provided by the JVWS represent a substantial proportion of tap
infrastructure which does exist within Kebribeyah woreda-in both rural and urban areas. The notion
that the JVWS is significant to the livelihoods of Kebribeyah woreda is supported by the fact that
Kebribeyah pastoralists along the pipeline-as well as UNHCR and ARRA staff-mentioned the
importance of the system for pastoralists across the woreda, as the JVWS draws pastoralists from up to
a 75 km radius during the dry season.
In relation to the refugee camp itself, which is not accounted for in this data, it can be deduced that
refugees enjoy a significantly higher standard of living than their Ethiopian counterparts in terms of
water infrastructure. While UNHCR aspires towards there being no single household more than 200
meters from a tapstand and 65% of households currently live within that distance, it nevertheless is a
proportion significantly higher than 9% for Kebribeyah woreda as a whole, 40% for the Kebribeyah
urban areas and the dismally low 3% for Kebribeyah rural areas. This is especially significant as the near
inverse amount of non-refugee Kebribeyah residents (65% of Kebribeyah woreda households, 43% of
Kebribeyah urban households and 69% of Kebribeyah rural households) draw their water from
unimproved sources, which does not speak to the fact that they may have to walk significantly longer
distances than 200 meters to that unimproved water source-and it is particularly women and children
who tend to bear the burden of water collection. Importantly, as all Kebribeyah refugee residents enjoy
an average of 15 liters of water per day," they are in a significantly more advantageous position as their
water has the potential for being significantly cleaner to drink than water from an unimproved source.
Unfortunately, despite the strides which have been made in relation to water provisioning for the JVWS,
there still exist a number of shortfalls-the half-empty glass. This has to do with issues of both quality
and quantity of water.
An Assessment of Water Quality in Kebribeyah Camp Compared to Three other Camps
A Brief Assessment of Water Quality in Kebribeyah
Kebribeyah tapstands have significant variability in quality.'2 The presence of E.coli in two-
thirds of water samples gathered from Kebribeyah tapstands indicates fecal contamination of the water
supply. As can be noted in Figure 2-4, one-third of samples detected Intermediate levels of E. coli
11 While by official UNHCR estimate, Kebribeyah refugees should enjoy on average 15 liters per person per day (based upon the daily
production capacity of the boreholes and treatment facility), this estimate is likely to be less as the water supply is intermittent and on some
days no water runs from tapstands.
12 Fecal contamination in 2 birkas and 35 jerrycans were also sampled for this study as part of the larger assessment. Water quality data drawn
from all four camps can be found in Appendix 3.
concentrations while another one-third detected High
levels of E. coli concentrations. In contrast, when
referring to Figure 2-5 which details the four camps
tested (AwBarre, Kebribeyah, Sherkole and Shimelba),
Conformity / Low concentrations were at a much
higher percentage (75% versus 33%), strongly
suggesting problems with water management at
Kebribeyah camp. In addition, Kebribeyah was the
only camp where water samples collected from
tapstands had any trace of contamination. When
Kebribeyah's nine tapstands are not included in the
measure detailed in Figure 2-5, 100% of all tapstands
(in AwBarre, Sherkole and Shimelba) tested at
Conformity / Low concentrations. (Refer to Appendix 3
Water Quality ant Public Tap Stands Compared
Figure 2-4:
Kebribeyah Camp Assessment of E. coli at Public
Tapstands
Risk Level PercentageTotal of Total
Conformity / Low Risk 3/9 33%
Intermediate Risk 3/9 33%
High Risk 3/9 33%
Very High Risk 0/9 0%
Fou Cam Asesmn of E . 0ol at Puli Ta st
Risk Level Total Percentage
of Total
Conformity / Low Risk 18/24 75%
Intermediate Risk 3/24 12.5%
High Risk 3/24 12.5%
Very High Risk 0/24 0%
Source: Field visits to four camps (June-August 20110)
Public Health Implications of Poor Water Quality
The public health implication of fecal contamination of the water supply is that it can
significantly contribute to diarrheal disease. Of the four interventions one can make with relation to
combatting diarrhea-that of water quantity, water quality, sanitation and hygiene-some recent
studies have indicated that water quality interventions can have the highest impact. Contrary to earlier
conclusions by S.A. Esrey (1985, 1991), where water quality was given the lowest priority with regards to
the impacts it could have in reducing diarrheal disease (15% based on meta-analysis of 67 studies from
28 countries), this study's conclusions have largely been refuted with recent meta-analysis studies.
Hugh Waddington notes, "Water quality interventions are significantly more effective than interventions
to improve water supply," while saying, "Water quality interventions on average effect a 42% reduction
in child diarrhea." (Waddington 2009, 26) These findings are generally consistent with recent findings of
Lorna Fewtrell and John Colford who conclude-based upon close review of 60 distinct studies-that
water quality interventions can have on average a 39% reduction in diarrheal disease. (Fewtrell and
Colford 2004) Thus, the poor water quality has potential wide ranging impacts on the health of the
refugees of Kebribeyah.
- -................
Possible Reasons for Poor Water Quality
Two possible reasons can be deduced for why the water quality is compromised: (a) a break in
the pipe infrastructure and/or (b) insufficient amounts of chlorine applied at the treatment facility.
Whether the reason is due to one or the other reason cannot be definitively concluded without further
testing. One point of evidence suggesting that chlorine is inconsistently applied at the treatment facility
is the variability in water quality from Conformity/Low concentrations (Sample ID 14) to High
concentrations (Sample ID 44) at the same tapstand (Zone 2 Section 2 House 67) on June 19 and June 23.
This evidence is further supported by the fact that water drawn from a tapstand at Zone 2 Section 2
House 67 (Sample ID 44) tested for High risk on June 23, but water in 3 out of 4 jerrycans storing the
previous day's water from the same tapstand tested at Conformity/Low risk. In any case, inconsistently
applying chlorine at the treatment facility and/or a break in the infrastructure-as well as not identifying
and addressing these issues-are both indicative of a management failure. A management failure is also
indicated by a problem of regular quantity of water (i.e. the intermittent water supply) within
Kebribeyah camp.
An Assessment of Water Quantity in Kebribeyah Camp Compared to Three other Camps
A Brief Assessment of Water Supply in Kebribeyah Camp
Kebribeyah tapstand attendants and refugees have all noted that the water supply has
regularized significantly since the 2010 electrification of the JVWS. Zone 4 of Kebribeyah can attest to
this positive impact; both tapstand attendants and refugee residents indicated they received a
consistent water supply for an entire month up until the site visit. However, according to tapstand
attendants and refugee residents in Zones 1, 2 and 3 of Kebribeyah camp, the water supply was
intermittent. While water is scheduled to be received within the camp everyday between the hours of
8am - 12am and 2pm - 5pm, tapstand attendants and refugee residents in these three zones spoke of
daily water outages that last between hours to days.
Overall, tapstand attendants claimed that while water is generally received on a daily basis, the
timing is never certain. This assertion was confirmed during multiple site visits in which jerrycans waited
beneath open taps and in assembled queues at dry tapstands. This phenomenon was witnessed on
multiple occasions by the author during hours when water was supposedly scheduled to be available.
Refugee Adaptations to an Intermittent Water Supply
The intermittent water supply has therefore led refugee residents in Zones 1,2 and 3 to pursue
adaptations necessary for daily survival-namely, (a) buying water from a birka, 13 (b) drawing water
from working tapstands in other sections of the same zone and (c) storing water for prolonged periods
of time. Such adaptations, while necessary for daily survival, have adversely affected Kebribeyah
residents by increasing their health risks.
(a) Zone 1 and 2 - Buying water from a birka: Tapstand attendants and refugee residents in Zones 1
and 2 described day-long water outages as weekly occurrences which happen on the zone level.
When one tapstand is dry in Zone 1 and 2, then all tapstands are dry. In such situations, refugee
residents buy water from a birka. As many households lack a sufficient amount of jerrycans with a
collective capacity to store water beyond a 24 hour period, most refugee residents in Zones 1 and 2
have no choice but to buy water from a locally-owned birka. Filling a 20 litre jerrycan costs 1 birr.
While free water could possibly be tapped in another zone, many refugee residents in Zones 1 and 2
still prefer paying for birka water, as functioning taps will most likely be overcrowded. Two birkas
accessed by refugee residents both tested at Intermediate risk. (Appendix 3) Environmental
contamination of this water is a serious concern as algal growth was visibly apparent in both birkas
and protections (such as a cover or hand pump) do not exist to prevent environmental
contamination. Some refugee residents have noted that mosquito larvae are visibly apparent in the
A birka.
Above: the birka proprietor, who is from the local community.
Right: a purchaser of birka water, a refugee woman.
13 An open and unprotected rainwater harvesting reservoir
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birka, which may explain recent malaria incidences within Kebribeyah camp. While refugee
residents acknowledged the potential danger of drinking birka water, many noted they still neither
boil nor treat the water.
(b) Zone 3 - Drawing water from working tapstands in other sections or zones: The tapstand
attendant in Zone 3 (Zone 3 Section 2 House 72) noted that her tapstand was one of the few
receiving consistent water within Zone 3. For this reason, refugee residents throughout the zone
come to her tapstand. However, the influx of refugees seeking water overburdens this tapstand.
Overcrowding and an insufficient amount of time to access water are quite common, according to
the tapstand attendant, leading to frequent conflict and exclusion of refugee residents of other
zones.
(c) All Zones - Storing water for prolonged periods of time: When extra jerrycans are available,
refugee residents have developed a habit of storing water beyond a 24 hour period. While water is
generally available on a daily basis, regularly occurring water outages that can lasts for days without
prior notification compel refugee residents to store water. The limited quantity thereby causes
refugee households to use water as sparingly as possible, with hand washing and bathing being the
first water-related actions to be foregone.
Public Health and Social Implications of an Intermittent Water Supply
While it has been noted by Waddington (2009) and Fewtrell and Colford (2004), that water
quantity / supply is one of the four major intervention categories which has the least impact in reducing
diarrheal disease, it goes without saying that a consistent water supply as well as a daily minimum do
indeed have a significant impact in ensuring that other WASH interventions have maximum impact. For
example, while Waddington notes that proper hygiene can have, on average, a 31% relative reduction in
child diarrhea morbidity, (Waddington 2009, 42) he also notes that hygiene or water quality
interventions are significantly more effective in reducing diarrheal disease when implemented in
environments where baseline water supply is improved. An example of this can be seen when an
intermittent water supply causes refugees to store water for prolonged periods of time, leading to more
conservative use of water and thereby equates to hand washing and bathing being the first to be
sacrificed when water is low. Also, as refugees are compelled to buy water from birkas, the refugees'
right to clean drinking water is compromised and their health can potentially be highly compromised as
birkas are neither protected nor is water treated for contamination.
Somali refugee boy collecting water at a tapstand. Tapstands are commonly enclosed with barbed wire, further underscoring the contested
nature of water in Kebribeyah camp.
Importantly, an intermittent water supply also has very significant social impacts. As noted with
the overcrowding at tapstands, many times this leads to conflict as insufficient amounts of time to
collect water may lead to desperation. The contested nature of water in Kebribeyah is all the more
contextualized by the sight of barbed wire surrounding each tapstand. Furthermore, the vulnerability of
refugees is increased as it forces refugees to collect water from birkas. Birkas are not publicly owned,
but privately owned, and therefore put already economically vulnerable refugees in an even more
vulnerable position. Yet, the potential conflict encountered at overcrowded taptands compels those
who have little money to buy from birkas regardless. Even when a household cannot afford to buy
water, two individuals noted they'd prefer to risk being beaten for stealing from the birka than go to
another tap stand. Others-mainly women and children-risk collecting water late at night when the
birka proprietor is sleeping. The intermittent water supply, therefore, has very adverse impacts on the
well-being of the refugees of Kebribeyah.
. . ..... . . . ......... ..
Management Institutions to Blame, but Who to Blame?
The poor water quality and intermittent water supply are strong indicators of failures in
management. In relation to water quality, there is evidence described earlier that chlorine is
inconsistently applied at the treatment facility. Alternatively, there is the possibility that breaks in the
pipes cause the poor water quality results we have seen. As maintenance of the infrastructure is a key
component of sound management, this is another possible indicator of management failure. In relation
to the intermittent water supply, while scarcity of the boreholes is not the case and electrification of the
system guarantees that fuel shortages are not a reason behind a stop in service, again the likely culprit is
ineffective management.
Interviews with UNHCR field staff, drivers and translators involved frequent mention of the
general ineptitude of KWD to take on management of the system. For one, a frequent turnover in
management and staff (which occurs every eight to twelve months) from the Somali Regional
presidential level'4 all the way down to the woreda council and KWD manager makes it difficult to
ensure continuity of agreements, understandings and capacity.'" Over the course of two years up until
my site visit, there were three different managers of KWD. This is significant as building lasting capacity
becomes a task even more difficult to acheive, thereby leading to multiple times in which the KWD staff
are required to be trained to maintain the system themselves. Furthermore, the challenges of cost
recovery are widely noted, as there are widely held allegations of corruption. A factor behind the
frequent rotation in positions is that such opportunities are seen as self-enriching and so it is important
to share the benefits with others from the community. The whereabouts of fees collected from
tapstands and from users is unknown at the present time, as not a single invoice, proforma or even a
bank account exists in the KWD. The copy machine purchased two years prior-in order to keep better
records-still sits in a box.
These issues of shortfalls in management of public service providers, however, are not anything
new; in fact such dynamics are widespread amongst public service providers throughout the developing
world. In the foundational book on public service delivery, Good Government in the Tropics, Professor
Judith Tendler-MIT Professor of Political Economy-writes on page 1 the following:
14 The Somali Region is one of nine ethnically-based administrative regions created under the 1994 Constitution, which inaugurated Ethiopia as
a federal republic. The Region's capital is Jijiga. While the Constitution stipulates the each region's council of people's representatives is to
elect a state president for a six-year term, the extensive decision-making power granted to the regions allows for the Somali Region's regional
councils to elect a president every eight to twelve months.
1s Following traditional Somali tribal political structures, leadership roles are frequently passed around the community. UNHCR drivers and
translators from the region, however, noted that such a system exists to ensure benefit sharing in the form of kickbacks, bribes and access to
government funds for personal, family and clan usage.
Clientelism runs rampant, with workers being hired and fired on the basis of kinship and political
loyalty rather than merit. Workers are poorly trained and receive little on-the-job training.
Badly conceived programs and policies create myriad opportunities for bribery, influence
peddling and other forms of malfeasance. All this adds up to the disappointing inability of many
governments to deliver good public services and to cope with the persistent problems of
corruption, poverty and macroeconomic mismanagement. (Tendler 1997, 1)
Such text makes it clear that the challenges faced in Kebribeyah are nothing new. But one issue which is
important to highlight is the question of who is to blame? As detailed in Chapter 1 (Figure 1-5, Figure 1-
6), management of the water system is not solely the responsibility of KWD. A number of other actors
are involved in the financing, management and operations of this system, creating a complex and
confusing inter-institutional web of coordinating in water procurement. Division of labor along the
piped infrastructure-as the water travels from one jurisdiction to another-draws the system under
the management of many actors. But again, at the same time, no one who is ultimately accountable.
A distinct difference between Kebribeyah and the three other camps-where water quality
samples from tapstands were significantly better in regards to E. coli contaminations-has to do with
the fact that a clear hierarchy in decision-making and operations and implementation exists in the three
other camps. In Sherkole, Shimelba and AwBarre camps, UNHCR issues a simple sub-contract to one
implementing partner NGO-generally ARRA, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) or the Lutheran
World Federation (LWF)-to build, operate and manage a water system.
After departing Kebribeyah and making my way to another camp to conduct further water
quality assessments, I had mentioned my work in Kebribeyah and the state of water quality found at the
tapstands to an NGO water engineer. He was familiar with Kebribeyah and had a simple answer for why
it was failing. "When something goes wrong with the water system in Kebribeyah, no one knows who to
go to. That's their problem." The gentleman was able to sum up the management failure in Kebribeyah
in two sentences.
Thus, it is possible that the management structure itself is to blame for the shortfalls in service
delivery and general inability to hand over authority to local institutions. Especially as it appears as
though UNHCR has taken all possible steps to ensure that the local community could gain the capacity to
take on management responsibility (i.e. through lining up of funding for the system's construction, the
creation of KWD and Water Management Committees to self-manage and collect fees as well as the
paid provision of technical staff to operate, manage and capacitate the local leadership). The lack of
accountability stems from the confusing hierarchy of decision-making actors and the absence of a clearly
defined authority-thereby allowing management shortfalls to go unaddressed.
The question that therefore remains is how did such a complicated structure develop? Issues
related to territorial sovereignty-specifically in relation to UNHCR functioning on the sovereign
territory of a state and local community--largely explain how this current arrangement comes to exist
today. The next chapter therefore seeks to understand what factors drive the exercise of sovereignty on
the part of the Ethiopian state which results in the current arrangement we now have.
Chapter 3: The Negotiations over Territorial Sovereignty
in the Emergency Response Phase
While there is a widely held belief that refugee camps organically arise in the midst of an influx,
Kebribeyah did not develop as such. Generally, camps are established with a number of planning
considerations taken into account prior to siting the settlement. Among the key criteria taken into
account in site planning is local availability of water.16 The UNHCR Emergency Handbook-the agency's
sourcebook on all aspects related to physical planning-dedicates an entire chapter to water, with a
number of warnings explicitly expressed regarding poor water planning on the short- and long-term
prospects of a potential camp. And, yet, many of these water-related guidelines were not followed in
the case of Kebribeyah and neighboring Harti Sheik; the two camps are located more than 20 km and 40
km away respectively from the closest major freshwater source (Qaaho kebele).
To ensure that refugees enjoy a minimum of 7 liters per person per day (emergency allocation)
and an ideal 20 liters as noted in the UNHCR guidelines, it would seem the solution would be more or
less simple: site a camp as close to a freshwater source as possible. But as UNHCR is a multilateral
agency, it is not allowed to implement based upon technocratic considerations alone; it must also
respect the territorial sovereignty of the host country which requires the agency to also take into
account concerns of the Ethiopian state as well. Issues related to the security situation in the region
(and Kebribeyah woreda, more specifically), the history of the Ethiopian state presence in the region as
well as mobility / accessibility concerns were likely to have been prioritized over that of water. Such
considerations underscore the importance of sovereignty in camp placement.
While the early negotiations in the late 1980s and early 1990s successfully resulted in the
construction of Kebribeyah and Harti Sheik camps, sovereignty continued to weigh in on UNHCR
operations. As water had to be tankered to quench the thirst of hundreds of thousands of refugees
daily, violence erupted between the local pastoralist community and UNHCR over the fact that refugees
were enjoying water sourced from the sovereign soil of the Ethiopian state, while its own citizens
suffered from malnutrition and dying herds from drought. UNHCR's tenure in the region therefore came
into question once again, and the possible exercise of sovereignty by the Ethiopian state to either close
down camps or end UNHCR operations required the agency to once again engage the local community
16 The UNHCR's Emergency Handbook on water begins by noting, "Water is essential to life, health, and dignity and is therefore a basic human
right." (UNHCR 2007, p 238)
and host government with inducements. The Jerer Valley Water System (JVWS) was built as a result and
meant to be shared to lessen the burdens of hosting refugees. And given the distance between the
source and Kebribeyah, the extensive pipeline infrastructure of the JVWS cut through a number of
jurisdictions, thereby bringing on board multiple actors in its management.
While the lack of accountability resulting from this complex management arrangement largely
stems from these initial negotiations over sovereignty, construction of the infrastructure nevertheless
helped stave off conflict between the local and refugee communities in the short-term. The offering of
developmental incentives to the local community (in exchange for its invitation to site a camp or to
prevent conflict from erupting) is a common practice carried out by UNHCR to achieve objectives in the
emergency response phase. Such action helps lessen the perceived threat to sovereignty embodied by
the refugees themselves and lightens the burden of hosting a massive population influx. However, this
chapter will conclude by asking whether these development incentives in fact can prove detrimental to
the long-term development of the surrounding communities by creating a strong sense of dependence
on the continued presence of UNHCR.
The Importance of Water in the Initial Camp Planning Phase
The water objective of UNHCR in the emergency response phase is clear: "To provide a sufficient
amount of clean drinking water for the persons of concern and to meet their household and other
communal needs in such a way that facilitates easy and safe access and is reliable, efficient, cost-
effective and environmentally benign." (UNHCR 2007, p 238) The importance of achieving such an
objective ultimately requires that UNHCR "Ensure consideration of water supply at site selection and
planning stages" (UNHCR 2007, p 238) and further notes, "A site should not be selected on the
assumption that water can be found merely by drilling, digging or trucking....No site should be selected
where the trucking of water will be required over a long period." (UNHCR 2007, 210) And yet, the
Kebribeyah and Harti Sheik camps were sited far from a water resource-requiring the agency to carry
out the very action that the Emergency Handbook firmly warns against.
While UNHCR is a refugee agency entitled to do all that it can to ensure protection and healthy
livelihoods of refugees, it nevertheless is a multilateral agency which must respect the territorial
sovereignty of nation-states. Such is a baseline requirement of all outfits of the United Nations. Thus, in
addition to its technocratic solution of ensuring water can be locally sourced when deciding site
selection of a refugee camp, such a decision must be contextualized in relation to the host country's (as
well as local community's) sovereign right to maintain control over its own territory. As the Handbook
notes, "Initial decisions on the location of the camp should involve the host government as well as local
authorities and communities...." (UNHCR 2007, 206) and later states, "The role and responsibility of the
local and national authorities in site selection is of fundamental importance.... ideally, the needs and
human rights of the refugees should determine the size and layout of the site." And, almost in
anticipation of the fact that to achieve both is unlikely, the Handbook forewarns, "In practice, a
compromise has to be made when considering all of the relevant elements." (UNHCR 2007, 207)
While the Handbook identifies this as a compromise, Karen Jacobsen-refugee expert and
professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy-goes a bit further when describing the
negotiations which occur between the host state and UNHCR. She states, "When it comes to refugee
assistance, host states have donors [and UNHCR] over a barrel." (Jacobsen 2002, 593) Thus, we see
UNHCR in the position of having to balance the interests of two parties with one having significantly
more weight than the other. And in eastern Ethiopia, this was the case as state sovereignty largely won
over the interests of the refugees.
The Relevance of State Sovereignty in the Initial Camp Planning Phase
Throughout the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 UN
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, it is repeatedly stressed that UNHCR is meant to work in
cooperation with the state government of the territory in which it operates. Therefore, Professor
Jacobsen draws attention to the fact that when understanding camp management, it is important to
account for the heavy influence of host governments. As the main actors attempting to function and
implement on the sovereign soil of the host government are foreign nationals (both refugees and UN
staff), there is a need to tread lightly. Aside from the simple fact that UN staff need visas to enter,
UNHCR also needs an official invitation from the host government to operate within the country.
Professor Jacobsen notes, "Their [UNHCR] presence is therefore always at the mercy of the government
whose wishes they must take into account" and continues by noting that UNHCR activities are many
times, "constrained by the fact that its presence in the host country is at the discretion of the
government." (Jacobsen 1996, 663-664)
For this reason, state sovereignty heavily influences the placement of camps as well. The
agency neither buys nor rents land for refugee camps, but operates on land allocated to it by the host
government and by invitation of the local community only.17 Therefore, the interests of the state and
1 Land use is a sensitive issue in Ethiopia as land is considered to be in short quantities. Article 40(3)-(5) of the FDRE Constitution identifies the
Ethiopian government as the country's sole land owner which allots land usage to citizens based upon their needs, further empowering the
state to influence land use policy.
local community are likely to win out over basic criteria such as close proximity to a drinking water
source. In the case of Kebribeyah, a strong possibility exists that the accessibility of the site was
prioritized. Kebribeyah is located on a major highway. And while accessibility certainly is beneficial for
UNHCR and the refugees in ensuring regular supply of aid, it is also possible that the state's security
concerns may have stressed accessibility of the site. Qaaho kebele (the location of the borehole wells) is
situated within the vicinity of the frontline battles between the Ethiopian state and ethnic Somali
separatist fighters-which will be discussed later in this chapter. Thus, it is likely that the Ethiopian state
sought to place a camp where their ability to maintain a firm hold over the camp-and its refugees-
was prioritized.
Again, a refugee influx'8 should not be connoted with a natural entitlement of UNHCR to
respond as it sees fit. The agency's operations are also heavily influenced by host government concerns,
which include the very implications of a refugee presence on the sovereign territory of the state, the
history of the Ethiopian government's control over said territory, as well as the potential burden that
accompanies the hosting of refugees. All topics will be further discussed in this chapter.
The Challenges to Sovereignty Posed by Refugees and UNHCR
Arjun Appadurai and the Challenges to Territorially-based Sovereignty
As the social-cultural anthropologist Arjun Appadurai notes, "Throughout the world, the
problem of immigrants, cultural rights and state protection of refugees is growing, since very few states
have effective ways of defining the relationship of citizenship, birth, ethnic affiliation and national
identity." (Appadurai 2003, 339) Accordingly, this poorly defined relationship between host
government and refugee is exacerbated by the fact that "every major refugee camp" embodies a space
of "translocality" which "create complex conditions for the production and reproduction of locality."' 9
(Appadurai 2003, 339) And, aside from simply being spaces onto themselves, translocalities (i.e. refugee
camps) challenge the very notion of a state's sovereignty over a specified space as the UN agencies (i.e.
UNHCR) operating within them embody "evolving non-state forms of macro-political organization" and
serve as foundations for "transnational loyalties." (Appadurai 2003, 339) What this translates to in the
Kebribeyah context is a situation in which the Ethiopian state is no longer the sole decision-maker within
18 Karen Jacobsen defines a "refugee influx" as "people who flee their country en masse. A mass influx of refugees is defined as that which
occurs when, within a relatively short period (a few years), large numbers of (thousands) of people flee their places of resident for the asylum
country. There are many possible causes of mass flight, including civil war and insurgency, ethnic or religious persecution, environmental
disaster and famine. In cases such as civil war and environmental disaster, refugees do not flee their governments but rather the violence,
disorder and lack of resources created by the crisis."
19 Along with "every major refugee camp," Arjun Appadurai identifies border zones, tourist zones, free trade zones (FTZs), migrant hostels, and
neighborhoods of guest workers and exiles as "translocalities."
its own territory. For a government-particularly one which already maintains lose control over a
district like Kebribeyah woreda and the Somali Region more generally-this can be perceived as
threatening as it challenges the state's very relevance in the area.
Thus, refugee camps-and the spaces which come to embody them-are physical reflections of
the fact that "sovereignty and territoriality, once twin ideas, live increasingly separate lives." (Appadurai
2003, 347) And, while Appadurai would argue that for this reason there is a need to rethink sovereignty
in light of an increasingly post-national geography, the thesis argues that state governments (particularly
the Ethiopian state in this context, for reasons of history in the region) nevertheless find such a trend to
be especially threatening to their relevance. Thus, Appadurai argues that "territory, once a
commonsense justification for the legitimacy of the nation-state, has become the key site of the crisis of
sovereignty in a transnational world." For this reason, "In short, states are the only major players in the
global scene that really need the ideal of territorially based sovereignty." (Appadurai 2003, 347) To a
great extent, the influx of Somali refugees in the late 1980s was yet another page in Ethiopia's long
history of contestation over its sovereignty in the region. Understanding this historical framework,
therefore, is likely to explain (at the very least partially) the state's decisions behind why Kebribeyah's
accessibility was prioritized over water-related concerns.
History to Contextualize the Battles over Sovereignty in the Region
Located less than 75 kilometers from the Ethiopia-Somalia border, Kebribeyah is situated in an
area where sovereignty is-and has been-highly contested. Due to a combination of arbitrarily
delineated borders, Somali irredentist ambitions in the region and two-way human flows across political
boundaries, Addis Ababa's hold over the region has been repeatedly challenged.
Following the Berlin Conference in 1884,20 the Scramble for Africa sped up as European powers
cemented their African spheres of influence into full-fledged colonies. By 1895, the only remaining
independent states in Africa were Liberia and Ethiopia (then Abyssinia).21 As a state with a Christian
ruler, Ethiopia's right to self-rule was largely protected; however, its sovereignty over Somali territories
2 While many believe the Conference was a simple division of a map of Africa over an evening of cigars and cognac between various European
ministers, the General Act of the Berlin Conference had only divided Africa up into regions in which certain European powers could "pursue"
the legal ownership of land. The Principle of Effectivity prevented a European power from simply claiming a portion of Africa by stipulating that
an aspiring colonial power was required to legitimate its presence (and rule) over a piece of territory. To do so, colonial powers were required
to sign protectorate treaties with local leaders and establish an administration to police and maintain control over a delineated territory.
Another stipulation required that claimed land be made economically productive. If all these conditions were not fulfilled, another colonial
power had the legal right to establish itself within the territory.
21 As a Christian state, Ethiopia's right to self-rule was largely protected. However, Ethiopia's territorial sovereignty was repeatedly threatened
as it was a buffer caught in the middle of the colonial ambitions of British, French and Italians seeking to expand their territorial control
throughout the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia was repeatedly used as a proxy throughout the colonial era, as it was a recipient of modern weapons
and ammunitions.
in the east were repeatedly threatened by British, French
and Italian colonial ambitions seeking to expand their
influence throughout the Horn of Africa. Following
successful defeat of the invading Italians during the First
Italo-Abyssinian War in March 1896, Ethiopian claims
over the current Somali Region were solidified in a series
of treaties with the British and French in 1897. However,
the Addis Ababa administration had little control over the
region-particularly in areas east of Jijiga-until 1934,
when a joint Ethiopian-British boundary commission
demarcated the borders between Ethiopia and British
Somaliland.
Amongst ethnic Somalis, Ethiopia's presence in
AWNT Nthe Somali Region has been a great source of tension
A Somali Communist poster supporting the Greater throughout the 2 0th century. The respective
Somalia movement.
independences and subsequent consolidation of Italian
and British Somalilands into a newly established Somalia on July 1, 1960 added momentum to a fledgling
Somali irredentist movement which referred to the region as Somali Galbeed or "Western Somalia."
Siad Barre-military dictator and former President of Somalia from 1960 to 1991-attempted to reduce
clan-based loyalties and build a strong national identity by advocating the notion of a Greater Somalia,
which would encompass predominantly Somali areas in neighboring Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and
Somalia proper. These ambitions culminated in a less than one-year conflict-the Ogaden War-fought
between Ethiopia and Somalia from 1977-1978, in a conventional Cold War battle of strange bedfellow
alliances that repeatedly shifted. When on July 13, 1977 Somalia invaded Ethiopia, the Somali forces
quickly overtook the Ethiopians.
22 The first and only realization of Greater Somalia was during World War 11 when, following the conquest of Ethiopia by the Italians in 1936,
Ethiopia's Somali Region was formally annexed to Italian Somaliland along with newly-conquered British Somaliland. While short-lived, the
nine years of unity nevertheless left its mark on the irredentist movement. By the end of WWII, however, the Somali Region was returned to
Ethiopian control under heavy pressure from the United States.
23 While the United States and the Soviet Union initially provided arms and financial support to Emperor Haile Selassie's Ethiopia and Siad
Barre's Somalia respectively throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, support channels quickly shifted following the September 1974 overthrow
of Emperor Haile Selassie by the Communist Derg. The Soviet Union found in the Derg what they believed to be a legitimate Marxist-Leninist
movement worthy of support, thereby leading the United States to switch its support from Ethiopia to Somalia. Internal instability as well as a
growth in separatist movements also resulted from Haile Selssaie's demise. The irredentist Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) carried out
attacks against Ethiopian governmental and military installations in the region until in 1977-78, it joined forces with the invading Siad Barre
military.
.............................. .   .  . .....  ...
The Battle of Jijiga was a key turning point during the war, resulting in Ethiopia losing control of
90% of the Somali Region and ultimately demonstrating the military importance of Jijiga. The militarily
strategic nature of the city was further exemplified as the tides of the war turned towards Ethiopia's
favor immediately following its recapture of Jijiga in February 1978. The subsequent Somali retreat led
to destabilization of the Siad Barre regime, but nevertheless left behind a bolstered separatist
movement continued by the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). Eventually the movement was
absorbed by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and has since continued its fight. Throughout
the 1990s, and especially since 2007, ONLF has launched a number of attacks against Ethiopian troops
and government installations in the region. The areas surrounding Kebribeyah are particularly
contentious as Qaaho kebele (the location of the borehole wells) is more or less on the frontlines of the
battles between the Ethiopian military and the ONLF.
Thus, a long history of challenges to Ethiopian sovereignty over the Somali Region provides a
framework for understanding how Addis Ababa is likely to perceive influxes of Somali refugees to the
region as well as placement of camps. And, aside from the fact that influxes further contribute to
current ethno-demographic imbalances,24 the fact that Somali irredentists have entered Ethiopia under
the guise of being refugees and inserted themselves into ONLF militias, (Jacobsen 1996, 666) does not
help the case for refugees.
Nevertheless, repeated conflict in the region has created a long history of refugee flows and
displacement from both sides of the border. By 1989, a combination of ethnic Somali nationals of
Ethiopia (roughly 600,000 refugees) who had yet to return to Ethiopia during the aftermaths of the
Ogaden War and ethnic Somali nationals of Somalia (over 600,000 refugees) fleeing civil war violence in
northern Somalia (now known as Somaliland) generated a little less than 1.3 million refugees in the
region. (Chapin Metz 1992) Together, they placed great burdens on their host countries who were
already unable to provide for their own citizens.
The Burdens Posed by Refugees
The Broadening Definition of "Refugee" as Burdensome
In addition to perceiving refugees as threats to sovereignty and security, host government also
have a tendency to perceive refugees as burdensome, thereby influencing the extent to which the
Ethiopian government is welcoming of refugees. The initial influx of over 600,000 Somali refugees into
2 While ethnic Somali citizens of Ethiopia comprise of only 6.2% (4,586,876 individuals) of the national population (73,750,932 individuals),
they constitute 97% (4,320,478 individuals) of the population of the Somali Region (4,445,219 individuals). (Ethiopia Central Statistics Agency,
2007)
eastern Ethiopia in 1988 was part and parcel of a much wider trend common throughout the African
continent. In relation to international laws classifying and protecting refugees, the UN Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees (195 1)25 defines a refugee as a person who "owing to a well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality or is unable or...unwilling to return to
it." While the Convention was initially drafted in the post-WWII European context, in relation to
international displacements resulting from persecution for an individual's identity markers, the UN
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967) broadened the scope of the Convention so that it no
longer applied to European refugees displaced by WWII alone.
However, Somali refugees in Ethiopia do not necessarily fit the traditional definition of a refugee
(as they lack a degree of legitimate fear of persecution for markers of individuality). Ethiopian refugee
expert Kibret Markos notes that "The Somalis in Ethiopia are escapees from civil strife, famine and other
similar causes that do not discriminate between groups and have no basis for refugee status as the
element of link between fear and membership in a group does not exist in their case." (Markos 1997,
370)26 However, these Somali refugees are still granted the right to identify themselves as refugees
under a definition issued by the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
In an effort to align the definition with the African context-where independence movements
and post-colonial civil wars sweeping across the continent were generating scores of displacement-the
OAU issued the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems (1969), both signed
(1969) and ratified (1973) by Ethiopia. Under said Convention, a refugee is defined to include, "Any
person compelled to leave his/her country owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination
or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or
nationality." While certainly applicable to the geographic context, the broadness of the terminology
thereby allowed for entitlements of a much wider swath of Somalis-in this case, hundreds of
thousands-to claim asylum in another country, with Ethiopia being one of them. However, as a
massive population influx to any locale-let alone one suffering from famine, malnutrition and water
scarcity-poses a major burden, the Ethiopian government from 1988 into the mid-1990s came to see
25 The 1951 Convention builds off of Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) which grants individuals the right to seek
asylum in other countries when fleeing persecution.
2 While some may rightly note that the Issaq clan who predominated the Somali National Movement (SNM) were specifically targeted in the
wholesale bombings of Hargeisa and Burao under the 'pacification' campaign of Siad Barre, their continued stay in Ethiopia--specifically of
those who are in Kebribeyah-is not as much to do with the fact that they are of the Isaaq clan, but more specifically due to the fact that there
is general insecurity and continued famine in Somalia.
Somali refugees not only as potential challenges to territorial sovereignty but more significantly as
burdens.
The Inability of the Host Government to Provide, and the Violence which Results
The burdens posed by an influx of Somali refugees on the Ethiopian government in the late
1980s and early 1990s was legitimate. And such challenges are not Ethiopia specific, but common
throughout Africa at the very least. Professor Jacobsen notes, "Now, more than ever before, African
host governments are arguing that refugees present serious economic, environmental and security
threats, and that they can no longer afford to keep their borders open or to allow refugees to remain for
any length of time." (Jacobsen 2002, 578) Similarly, with regards to Ethiopia specifically, Markos argues
that "While international refugee law aims at the protection of all [international human] rights, the
material ability of Ethiopia has hampered their full accessibility to the Somali refugee in Ethiopia." For
this reason Markos notes, "Throughout Africa, hosting countries weakened by paralyzing economic
realities are flooded with enormous numbers of refugees, and the task of extending assistance and
protection is infinitely more difficult than mere accession of international instruments laying down the
standards of such protection." (Markos 1997, 377)
The inability of the host government to deal with refugee influxes is mirrored quite clearly in
relation to water provision. The UNHCR Handbook on Emergencies warns that during a large influx
period, "Refugees may compete with the local population for water resources. This may cause problems
between the two groups and lead to violence..." (UNHCR 2007, p 241) Adrian Martin, Senior Lecturer in
Environmental Management at the University of East Anglia would add to this statement by noting,
"Refugee movements are generally the result of conflict but can also be a cause of conflict," particularly
with relation to scarce natural resources. (Martin 2005, 331) More specifically, as violence is an
increasingly common outgrowth of sudden resource scarcity, Jacobsen sheds light on the structural
dimension of national security which host governments analyze when contemplating a response to a
sudden refugee influx.
Jacobsen notes that prior to an influx, there is an existing balance between a state's population
and its resource endowments-among them, water. "This balance is upset when population demands
on resources become too great and the government is unable to manage or contain them. Decreased
structural security leads to a 'crumbling' of the state and threats to regime security." (Jacobsen 1996,
672) Thus, from the perspective of the state, not only is there an inherent fear of refugees-as they
may pose a direct security threat to the state as the sovereign in a given territory-but, also of the
indirect threats posed by rapid demographic increase which can have destabilizing effects in the country
overall-or more specifically, in a local community. It is with an understanding of this fear held by state
governments that one can understand how a state government may rationalize a refugee influx, and
ultimately how it may exercise its sovereignty. State governments many times perceive refugees as a
burden (that can lead to local conflict and violence); and for this reason there always exists the
possibility that a government can utilize its ultimate trump card of sovereignty to decide and effect
whether refugees are allowed to enter, how camps are planned, where camps are sited or even whether
UNHCR can operate on the sovereign soil of Ethiopia. Yet, finding ways to break the inevitability of
resource scarcity-driven conflict can be achieved and are detailed in the following section.
Negotiating Sovereignty to Get Work Done
Breaking the Inevitability of Resource Scarcity-driven Conflict
As noted, threats posed by refugee influxes on the structural security of the host government
have a major influence on how a state is to exercise its sovereignty when dealing with refugees.
However, potential inter-communal conflict-caused by a massive influx of refugees, an added strain on
scarce resources and the potentially superior treatment afforded refugee in comparison to surrounding
locals-is an outcome state governments seek to avoid and is the ultimate adverse effect UNCHR seeks
to avoid at all costs as protection of refugees is considered a core objective of UNHCR,2 as stipulated in
its Mandate.28
When understanding the social psychology of inter-communal conflict, it is noted that social
divisions between identity groups become more pronounced and more difficult to traverse when the
surrounding context creates a perception of relative deprivation. This is significant as it is different from
scarcity in itself, in that the driver of conflict is a perceived injustice. Such a dynamic is what unfolded in
Kebribeyah after the camp was established and during a long series of devastating droughts. In said
situation, a minor difference (i.e. refugee vs. local) is emphasized and exploited, thereby contributing to
antagonism towards the other, heightening distinctiveness between groups as well as accentuating the
other groups as either outsiders or rivals. (Hewstone & Greenland, 2000; Jackson and Smith, 1999;
Martin 2005) And in relation to pastoralists in the eastern Ethiopian commons, again, the point of
contention is not so much the scarcity itself, but the exclusion from accessing scarce resources, which
27 The three core objectives of UNHCR as stipulated in its Statute are to pursue (a) protection, (b) assistance and (c) permanent solutions for
refugees. The three permanent solutions are (i) local integration, (ii) voluntary repatriation and (iii) third country resettlement.
28 in the first paragraph of the Annex of its Statute, it reads "1. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, acting under the authority
of the General Assembly, shall assume the function of providing international protection, under the auspices of the United Nations, to refugees
who fall within the scope of the present Statute..." [United Nations General Assembly Resolution 428 (V) (14 December 1950)]
threatens the very livelihoods of pastoralists and ultimately sparks violent conflict. (Bogale, 2006;
Bogale, 2007; Markakis, 2003; Smith, 2001; Unruh, 2005)
Prior to the construction of the Jerer Valley Water System (JVWS) when water was tankered to
Kebribeyah and Harti Sheik camps, refugees enjoyed water while local pastoralists along the route were
denied access to the water; the culmination of such resentment was blockading of water tankers and
the eventual killing of 2 CARE International drivers. This created a situation in which, "Local resentment
is often aroused when refugees are perceived to receive special treatment." (Jacobsen 1996, 668)
Similarly, two studies conducted in sub-Saharan Africa on the relations between a local community and
a refugee camp show that prioritization of refugees over host communities feeds into inter-communal
tensions. (Ek and Karadawi, 1991; Adisa, 1996) With regards to water-and environmental resources
more generally-Martin noted such a dynamic in Bonga, a camp in western Ethiopia. (Martin 2005, 336)
Thus, in Kebribeyah, conflict erupted not over the water scarcity in itself-but, the rightly perceived
belief that water was distributed unequally. Such a dynamic caused the local pastoralists to emphasize
their difference (i.e. sub-clan, region of origin) with the refugees, when in fact both parties were
ethnically Somali.
Thus, in the case of Kebribeyah, UNHCR offered to develop a shared water system to lessen the
burden posed by refugees. And beyond simply sharing water and the scarce resource, UNHCR offered
to build the most complex and extensive water system in its history.
Reframing the Notion of Refugees from Burden to Asset
UNHCR addressed the environment of scarcity, the perception of differential water sharing and
the resultant violence by building a water system to be shared between the local community and the
refugees. By flattening the divisions between the communities, UNHCR deterred further conflict and
produced a productive outcome-rather than unproductive violence-in the form of the Jerer Valley
Water System (JVWS). Such an example is a way in which UNHCR regularly reframes the idea of a
refugee being a burden to an asset. Jacobsen notes that while refugees impose a variety of security,
economic and environmental burdens on host countries, "they also embody a significant flow of
resources in the form of international humanitarian assistance, economic assets and human capital."
(Jacobsen 2002, 577) What Jacobsen deems "refugee resources"-the material, social and political
resources which are associated with refugees and "potentially represent an important state-building
29 In relation to water scarcity, the UNHCR Handbook notes, "Equity in the distribution of scarce water is an extremely important
consideration." It continues by noting that while those in special need of adequate water must be prioritized (i.e. children, the sick, wounded,
elderly, severely malnourished, etc), "scarce water must be evenly shared among the rest of the population." (UNHCR 2007, 257)
contribution to the host state. Refugee resources may help develop areas of the country, increase the
welfare of citizens, and extend the bureaucratic reach of the state." (Jacobsen 2002, 578)
This strategy is significant as Gaim Kibreab, Professor of Refugee Studies at the London South
Bank University notes that the "overriding concern" of host nations is to minimize costs and maximize
benefits associated with hosting refugees-for both the government and its citizens. Such aims are
fulfilled by policies and measures which reduce refugee reliance on social and economic infrastructure
while advocating that their own citizens tap into international refugee support systems. (Kibreab 1996,
674) Similar to these statements, UNHCR staff repeatedly mentioned that Kebribeyah continues to
exist-and other eastern camps were allowed to open-largely with the offering of incentives.
Many refugee hosting areas are enticed with the provision of new or improved transportation
infrastructure (i.e. roads, bridges, airports), medical clinics, schools, "both as an inducement to locals to
assist refugees, and to improve the delivery of humanitarian assistance." (Jacobsen 2002, 581) Aid
therefore gets shared between refugees and locals, where in one example in Uganda, 40% of assistance
provided by UNHCR in one specific district was directed to the host community to mitigate resentment.
(Kaiser 2000). At times, refugee camps embody a sort of "wish list including all the development
projects that the administration could not afford on its own." (Landau 2001) Thus, in a sense, such an
agreement seems very much a win-win situation, where the interests of two-sometimes conflicting-
sides can find common ground. But, is it possible that such an arrangement can be too good for its own
good?
Too Much of a Good Thing?
As noted in this chapter, Somali refugees embody a perceived challenge to the territorial
sovereignty of the Ethiopian state, which complicates the work of UNHCR. As the agency is mandated to
work in collaboration with the host government, UNHCR addresses such a challenge by engaging in
negotiations over the state's sovereignty and offers "refugee resources" in exchange for approval to site
a camp (in the initial phases of emergency response) and/or to mollify conflict between the local
community and the refugees (after the camp has been established). However, what can be a win-win
solution in the short-term may actually prove not to be a silver bullet in the long-term.
As can be noted in eastern Ethiopia during the refugee influx of the late 1980s, while UNHCR is
likely to have offered inducements (i.e. shared health and education facilities, paved roads) to potential
host communities, Kebribeyah (and Harti Sheik) were nevertheless placed in areas that were water
scarce. Accessibility and the Ethiopian state's ability to maintain control over the camp is likely to have
been prioritized. The JVWS was therefore built as a result of the fact that Kebribeyah (and Harti Sheik)
were located in areas where a freshwater source capable of supporting a population of hundreds of
thousands was unavailable. The system was also built as a developmental inducement to reduce
conflict with the local community and reframe the perception of refugees as burdens, or unjustly
benefiting from local environmental resources. And while the immediate objective of ensuring refugee
safety and providing water was accomplished with the construction of the system, the transition from
emergency response to meaningful development has been hindered by this very process of offering
incentives. Handing over full management of the water system would signify a positive result, but as
noted in Chapter 1, it appears that UNHCR may have to oversee the management of the water system
indefinitely.
Is it possible that the offering of incentives creates a misperception of UNHCR-as an agency
that simply provides benefits? While instrumental and needed in gaining compliance to site a camp or
mollifying conflict in the short-term, what are the implications of shared services, like water, in the long-
term? What will be noted in the following chapter is that the "refugee assets" offered by UNHCR-a
shared school, a shared health facility, and most importantly, a shared water system-created a
relationship of dependency and inter-dependency between the refugees, the local community, UNHCR
and the Ethiopian state. The shared infrastructure and services create a spatial fluidity which ties the
camp and the surrounding community into an integrated unit, further adding to a sense of dependency
as the camp and town tie in together closely. This inter-connection is all the more exemplified by the
complex web of a management arrangement which exists between all institutional actors partnered in
the JVWS operations. The difficulties faced by UNHCR in pulling out raises the question as to whether
these kinds of schemes are examples of a larger issue of dependency arising when too many benefits are
offered to the local community, without sufficient parallel development of local institutional capacity.
In relation to the JVWS specifically, as the local and national actors involved become
accustomed to the arrangement as it exists now-where UNHCR finances the operations and manages
the overall system more generally-there is little incentive to take on management of the JVWS. The
water system is just one aspect of the many components of a refugee camp, but it is a key node in the
daily lives of the surrounding local community. For this reason, especially as the situation in Kebribeyah
appears to be protracted, UNHCR finds itself partially trapped to this water system without a local
institution (in this this case, KWD) capable of taking on the full management of the system.
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Chapter 4: Fluidity, Dependency and Development
While successful negotiations over the Ethiopian state's territorial sovereignty allowed for
construction of Kebribeyah camp (and the infrastructure which accompanies it), these short-term
accomplishments eventually evolved into a linchpin for long-term survival of the local community. As
noted in the second chapter, the significantly higher water coverage rates provided by the Jerer Valley
Water System (JVWS) became a major asset for the local community and a degree of dependency
formed on the continued operations-however problematic-of the system with UNHCR always
available to fill in any gaps. The general lack of capability and motivation to take on full management
will be discussed further in this chapter.
As UNHCR is a humanitarian relief agency, its Mandate focuses on emergency response
generally and refugees more specifically. Nowhere in the Convention or the Protocol is there mention
of responsibility to the local community, which is primarily engaged during the initial site negotiations of
a camp and whenever conflict arises. The end product of such negotiations includes hard assets in the
form of shared infrastructure and/or services (which are instrumental in lessening the burdens of
hosting a refugee camp as well as the perceived differences between the refugee and local
communities), but there is little to show for local institutional capacity. Why this is the case, despite
UNHCR's concerted efforts to build capacity-will be discussed further.
To better understand the dynamics which have unfolded in Kebribeyah, this chapter frames
refugee camps in a broader perspective by making the case that refugee camps function like
"heterotopias" (as detailed by Michel Foucault) and play a very strong role in the daily lives of the
surrounding communities-to the point where the local community is heavily reliant on the present
level of service provision. An argument is made that while refugee camps are semi-autonomous spaces
under the jurisdiction of UNHCR, they should not be perceived as completely autonomous spaces devoid
of their surroundings-and the people who inhabit them.
By understanding this reality, a stronger case can be made for more attention paid to the local
community in the planning and programming of camp development and management, as they are
directly affected by (and subsequently strongly influence) the duration of UNHCR responsibilities in the
field. The thesis therefore looks into rethinking international foreign aid to expand the reach of
emergency relief to incorporate local institutional development as a key component of its programming.
Defining Refugee Camps as "Heterotopias"
In a lecture titled "Des Espaces Autres" given in March 1967, French philosopher and social
theorist, Michel Foucault, introduces the concept of "heterotopias"-these othered spaces which do not
and cannot adhere to strict categorization.30 What is significant about the concept of heterotopias is the
fact that whereas many believe and intend refugee camps to be distinct and isolated spaces
independent of their surroundings, they are in fact spaces which become deeply embedded in the
livelihoods, welfare and economies of surrounding communities. This is exemplified in the JVWS whose
pipe infrastructure ties together the refugee camp with the surrounding communities and jurisdictions.
The interdependence which forms between the camp and surrounding community-and the
subsequent fluidity of boundaries which allows refugees and local communities to walk freely from one
space to another (to access shared services such as health care and education)-adds to this idea of a
heterotopia which Foucault defines as a place in which multiple realities exist, overlap and are contested.
To build on this point further, Foucault provides six principles, all of which tie in well with refugee camps
as spaces. However, some key principles which tie in closely to the dynamics unfolding in the case of
Kebribeyah and the JVWS more specifically are as follows.
Beginning with Principle 1, Foucault notes that heterotopias exist in every culture, and further
describes them as 'crisis utopias'-places which exist for a purpose in all cultures and are "reserved for
individuals who are, in relation to society and to the human environment in which they live, in a state of
crisis." (Foucault 1967)" While Foucault draws a distinction between crisis heterotopias and
heterotopias of deviation, Kebribeyah switches from one definition to another depending on the
contemporary perception of the camp and what it has to offer. According to Foucault, "Heterotopias of
deviation" are reserved for "those in which individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the
required mean or norm are placed." (Foucault 1967) At times, Kebribeyah's refugees are perceived as
burdens (when services are not shared) and therefore "deviants." But when refugee assets are shared,
a perception of refugees as equals is more likely, thereby changing the perception of the refugee as a
neighbor in a time of crisis. The changing perception of refugees and refugee camps is further
contextualized in the following principle.
30 While Foucault cautions against the strict programmatization of spaces by noting in the past, "There were places where things had been put
because they had been violently displaced, and then on the contrary places where things found their natural ground and stability. It was this
complete hierarchy, this opposition, this intersection of places that constituted what could very roughly be called medieval space: the space of
emplacement." (Foucault, p 1)
3 When Foucault notes that such spaces are reserved for people within a society during a time of crisis and identifies groups historically
associated with crisis utopias (i.e. adolescents, menstruating women and the elderly), a parallel can be drawn with Kebribeyah and refugees.
The camp's refugees fall within this definition as both the local community and the refugee are ethnically Somali-of the same culture-and
both sides were refugees at one point in their existence. In this moment, those from Somalia are finding themselves as refugees-or more
specifically, those in a crisis.
Principle 2 notes that "a society, as its history unfolds, can make an existing heterotopia
function in a very different fashion; for each heterotopia has a precise and determined function within a
society and the same heterotopia can, according to the synchrony of the culture in which it occurs, have
one function or another." (Foucault 1967) The perfect embodiment of such is how refugees-and
refugee camps more generally-have been perceptually reframed from burden to asset as in the case of
Kebribeyah. Thus, the initial view of heterotopic refugee camps has shifted significantly as "host
government concerns can be offset if the benefits of refugees can be demonstrated, and if states can be
assisted in accessing and utilizing those resources...." (Jacobsen 2002, 579) And what will be discussed
further, ties into the fact that "Many international refugee agencies deliberately make relief assistance
available to local people so as to increase the receptiveness of the host community to refugees."
(Jacobsen 2002, 581) However, by floating these inducements, UNHCR's engagement with the local
community does not end with the simple approval to build a camp or when conflict is dampened. As an
additional inducement is offered, increased dependency on the continuance of such services (such as
water from the JVWS) grows.
This dependency manifests itself in a fluidity of borders across which both locals and refugees
frequently and casually traverse. Similarly, Principle 3 notes that "The heterotopia is capable of
juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible."
(Foucault, p 5) The multiple institutions of varying hierarchies converge in the physical management of
the JVWS and reflect this principle. And lastly, in relation to Principle 6, Foucault stresses that
heterotopias do not exist autonomous of their environs. Rather, "they have a function in relation to all
the spaces that remains." (Foucault 1967) While Foucault approaches this Principle from a more
conceptual reasoning (i.e. as a space of illusion which is meant to confirm or create a sense of reality for
the surrounding spaces), a connection to Kebribeyah can nevertheless be drawn. Kebribeyah camp
serves a very distinct purpose for Kebribeyah town and the region as a whole in that it draws together
resources which are accessed and shared with the local community. The water system is one facet of a
wider network of key goods which ensure a healthy existence of the surrounding local community,
which is a common occurrence for many refugee camps.
As Martin notes with relation to a refugee camp in western Ethiopia, "As is common in sub-
Saharan Africa, the location of a refugee camp actually attracted in-migration to Bonga, owing to the
expectation of service delivery and economic opportunities." (Martin 2005, 337) Similarly, Jacobsen
writes, "Refugee camps become repositories of such resources as relief supplies and food aid, vehicles,
communication equipment, employment and transport contracts with relief agencies, and other locally
valued and scarce materials." (Jacobsen 2002, 577) The importance of such camps is further
underscored by the fact that many Somalis from the local community have actively tried to insert
themselves into the camp as refugees.
Therefore, Foucault offers a framework through which one can rethink refugee camps as spaces
that are at once, both detached from, but also highly inter-connected to, their surroundings and serve a
very distinct purpose in the daily lives of the surrounding communities. In the case of Kebribeyah, local
survival is hinged on the continued existence of the refugee camp, and a strong degree of dependency
has formed on UNHCR's continued presence in Kebribeyah-particularly in relation to the continued
management of the JVWS. Developmental inducements have been instrumental in ensuring short-term
objectives; but long-term objectives related to self-sufficiency of the local community have yet to come
into fruition. Before drawing our attention to importance of building local institutions, the specific ways
in which dependency has been formed on UNHCR are first detailed.
Local Community and Host State Dependency on UNHCR Detailed
KWD's lack of will to manage the system properly-as noted in Chapter 2 with its neglect to
open the gate valve-is an entry point into understanding KWD's dependence on UNHCR. Field Staff,
translators and drivers have all noted that water shortages were reflections of sheer negligence-but
also of an intentional effort on the part of KWD to create an image that JWSO was not fulfilling its duties.
As JWSO maintains an annual maintenance and treatment facility operations contract of hundreds of
thousands of dollars, while KWD simply collects fees for water usage (a comparatively lesser amount of
funds), closing the gate valve offered an opportunity for KWD to make the case that JWSO was not
operating the treatment facility properly." Furthermore, allegations made by pastoralists of nighttime
vandalism of tapstands by KWD staff again underscores KWD's attempt at creating the image that JWSO
is not fulfilling its duties of maintaining the infrastructure.
The reason why a public utility would carry out such actions begs belief for many. However in
conversations with UNHCR staff, it was noted that KWD had also been requesting from UNHCR that it
3 As Kibreab notes, "In many countries, it is common for more vulnerable (and even less vulnerable) members of the local community to enter
refugee camps and pass themselves off as refugees in order to gain access to assistance. Refugee camps can serve as places of assistance for
local people in times of economic duress such as drought." (Kibreab 1993) Specifically mentioning the camps in eastern Ethiopia, Kibreab notes
how local pastoralists posed as refugees in order to tap into refugee benefits-a statement which is supported by Kibret Markos. In his
description of the situation, Kibret Markos notes that because of this "lack of clear identification," of refugees, "there is no means of stopping
Ethiopian nationals from benefiting from protection programmes intended for refugees exclusively." (Markos 1997, 373)
33 While identifying the true reason behind water shortages can be easily discerned by simply checking the gate valves at storage tanks, the
majority of the local community was unaware of such. However, the fact that regular shortages were generally only affected against the
refugees and pastoralists (all of whom identify with a clan separate from the clan associated with KWD) helped the local Kebribeyah leadership
understand that such shortages were intentional.
receive the full operations and maintenance contract from UNHCR-especially as electrification of the
JVWS no longer allowed KWD access to diesel, which it had previously pilfered for self-enrichment. Thus,
when this source of illicit income was discontinued, KWD began to target the JWSO contract as a
potential source of new income while making allegations that JWSO was not fulfilling its duties and also
emphasizing a wider argument that JWSO had no jurisdiction to be operating in a woreda outside their
own.
While KWD has made the request to take on more management responsibilities of the JVWS
(maintenance and operations) UNHCR is simply unable to do what it has so long wanted to do-
handover full management. Beyond fear of near imminent collapse of the system should UNHCR pullout
of the JVWS, but more importantly, such a move would adversely affect UNHCR's attempt at assuring
protection of the refugees. As water shortages-which are likely to become more pronounced and
prolonged should UNHCR refrain from all management responsibility-are likely to cause violent conflict
between the refugees and the local community, UNHCR wants to prevent this all together. But it is
important to note also that KWD is not asking for full management of the system so that it can function
as a self-sufficient and solvent entity, but rather in an attempt to secure a larger contract from UNHCR.
This is not a signifier of local capability to manage the system itself, but an indication of negative
dependence on the agency.
As noted in Chapter 2, while KWD collects fees from current water usage in the kebele and
pastoralists communities, there is little account of where these fees go and what they are used for.
Repeatedly, when there is an expense that arises which should be covered by water fees, KWD
continues to appeal to UNHCR for funding support. The Ethiopian government is well aware of this
dynamic and for this reason tries by all means to keep UNHCR involved in the management (and
finance) of this water system. No other actor-including the Regional and national government-is
willing to take on management themselves. 1 As discussed with UNHCR staff, even if UNHCR attempted
to move the refugees to a new camp and close operations in Kebribeyah (thereby freeing the agency
from responsibility to the system), the government would simply not allow it. The two other camps in
the region-Sheder and AwBarre-are already reaching capacity and if UNHCR attempted to build a new
camp, again, this would have to be under the approval of the Ethiopian government.35 Therefore, we
see in the case of the JVWS where sovereignty is not only a challenge which needs to be dealt with when
siting a camp and initially constructing an infrastructure project, but also a challenge UNHCR must deal
3 This is further noted by the lack of NGOs willing to take on management of the system as of August 2010.
3s An argument can also be made that there is a strong degree of dependence on
with when seeking to pull out. To a great extent, UNHCR's commitment to the system seems indefinite,
especially as half of Kebribeyah's refugees have not passed resettlement screening interviews and their
remaining time in Ethiopia seems indefinite.
This goes without saying that the Ethiopian government itself is likely to have developed a sense
of dependence on UNHCR as well. To this notes, Jacobsen states the following.
Host states mobilize this potential through their refugee policies which can be designed to
maximize the state's access to refugee resources. For example, the ways in which refugees are
settled and distributed in the host country affect the utilization of refugee resources. Requiring
refugees to live in camps ensures that international assistance is concentrated and more easily
accessible, and is usually seen as the only politically acceptable choice for governments when
there are security problems in the region. (Jacobsen 2002, 593)
Beyond the local community, the Ethiopian state also has an interest in seeing continued UNHCR
operations in the region. Camps many times serve as development nodes, particularly with regards to
water resources development. While not necessarily the case in Kebribeyah itself, with regards to other
refugee camps in the Somali Region, a senior expert familiar with the region noted that camps are
commonly placed far from a water source. When asked why this was the case, he shared his informed
opinion by stating that placing a camp far from a water source requires UNHCR to build piped
infrastructure to connect the boreholes to the camp, with the system many times crossing through
communities that would not have water otherwise. Sharing of the water ultimately results thereby
allowing the Ethiopian government to achieve the dual objective of allowing UNHCR to provide water
for its refugees while maximizing the benefits enjoyed by its rural constituent communities. Such efforts
bolster the image and relevance of the Ethiopian state in areas which have generally been neglected and
underdeveloped due to marginal locations, and ultimately where its sovereignty is contested.
More generally with regards to Kebribeyah itself, ensuring that UNHCR continues its operations
in the camp and of the JVWS empowers the Ethiopian state by making it relevant in the eyes of residents
of Kebribeyah woreda. Indirectly providing much needed water services through UNHCR allows the
Ethiopian government to gain a large degree of credit for providing this service without having to pay for
it.
Thus, it is apparent that while the initial construction of the JVWS was able to achieve short-
term goals associated with the emergency response phase (namely of procuring water to refugees and
dampening conflict between the local and refugee communities), it is difficult for UNHCR to transition
out of managing the system as local institutional capacity has failed to be built in parallel. More
importantly, a number of institutions on the local, regional and national level reap great political
benefits from continued operation and more importantly, finance of the system by UNHCR. However,
despite this dilemma, a case is made for streamlining greater local institutional capacity building into the
activities of UNHCR as the best possible exit measure from the JVWS. As it appears that the government
will do as much as it can to ensure UNHCR's continued general oversight of the system, the only possible
way in which full management and ownership can be handed over is if the local community and KWD
actively accept.
A Case for Long-term Development of Local Institutions in Relief Work
The Importance of Building Local Institutional Capacity
UNHCR notes the importance of proper management of water systems, by noting "An ill-
conceived or badly managed water supply system will soon create problems." It continues by noting
"All efforts to avoid long-term problems will prove, with time, very valuable." (UNHCR 2007, 248)
And avoidance of long-term problems does not entail insuring the long-term sustainability of the
engineering components of the water system alone, but also that of the management of the system as
well. In their foundational work, "Legal and Political Conditions of Water Resource Development,"
Vincent and Elinor Ostrom begin their writing with a quote from the California Department of Public
Works:
Control of water to secure maximum supply at costs determined by the economic situation is
the engineering problem and that problem is solvable. Ahead of the engineering
accomplishment is the engineering of men. The decision of the community at large must be
made. For accomplishment, its public body, its semi-public water organizations and its
individuals must unite in teamwork to pool, rearrange and compromise existing interests, to
legislate and to create a competent organization to carry out the engineering solution.
(California Department of Public Works, 1928)
The Ostroms draw special attention to this excerpt as they note the equal importance of the engineering
of (wo)men-in the design of institutional arrangements-to the engineering of the water resource
itself. (Ostrom and Ostrom 1972, 1) The two are not mutually exclusive, but deeply intertwined. Failure
in one of the two prongs would lead to failure in the other as noted in the JVWS. Long-term success
requires that the two be successful. Thus, the Ostroms note, "The engineering problems associated with
the design and operation of water works as physical facilities are always accompanied by problems in
the design and operation of organization arrangements with the conduct of people associated with the
enterprise." (Ostrom and Ostrom 1972, 1)
Similar to this point, with regards to water systems development in the Ethiopian context, Abate
notes, "In the past water management has been geared to extempore and ad hoc needs with an
apparent neglect of long-term consequences. What is needed is...long-term strategic perspectives to
enable the development of appropriate water allocation and management policies." (Abate 1994, 22)
And while building local capacity would be the logical answer, such an effort is easier said than done. In
the case of eastern Ethiopia, the way in which institutions currently function is a problem faced in
Kebribeyah and poses a significant challenge. "The culture of self-interest rules over the culture of
cooperation, goodwill, civic mindedness, and mutual trust. These narrow interests often impede
building institutions that reflect the broader interest of the society. They hinder efforts to reform social
institutions that can serve larger public interest at the slightest expense of individual's self-interest."
(Bogale 2006, 142) Thus, given this added challenge it must be stressed that building local institutional
capacity is no easy endeavor.
As Ostrom and Ostrom note, "The problem of devising institutional arrangements appropriate
for the development and use of water resources is greatly complicated by the common-pool, flow-
resource characteristic of any water system. Water as a liquid is difficult to partition and contain in
isolable units that can be packaged for marketable transactions. In addition, any water resource system
will involve a complex bundle of potential goods and bads which sustain a high level of interdependency
among the various joint and alternative users." (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1972: 5) Ostrom and Ostrom
continue by noting, "The high degree of interdependency among the individual users of a common-pool,
flow resource gives rise to a high potential for conflict and a high degree of politicization of institutional
arrangement for water resource development." (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1972: 6) For this reason, UNHCR
requires prolonged and continuous funding and personnel support to be utilized towards building local
institutional capacity. Currently, UNHCR's Jijiga Field Office has a single water engineer responsible for
oversight and management of water systems and all water-related activities in three camps in eastern
Ethiopia. And while great strides have been made, the efforts of one needs to be scaled up in order to
make the meaningful and timely impact needed to ensure a successful handover in the near term.
The Difficulties in Garnering Funds for Local Capacity Development
In UNHCR's Mandate, there is no mention of taking into account the local host community-
aside from the national government-and in the Handbook, there is only brief mention of incorporating
local host communities in refugee programming. Local institutional capacity building has no mention at
all. For this reason, even with expressed will on the part of UNHCR staff to carry out such activities, it is
difficult to receive the financial and personnel support towards such actions. Generally, UNHCR finds
the funds for local community development when it is tied to camp development itself or it can
somehow be marketed as a matter of refugee protection-a key component of UNHCR's Mandate.
However, the downsides to such reasoning are that funding is largely secured in a one-time package
meant to build or provide something tangible. UNHCR consistently finds it difficult to garner funds for
long-term operations and maintenance-let alone, local institutional capacity building which can span
the course of years.
When Martin notes that "The fact that refugees fall under the auspices of emergency relief also
influences the extent to which external interventions seek to foster long-term relationships with host
populations. Organizations that are specialized in dealing with emergencies find it difficult to broaden
their remit to include long-term 'development' strategies," (Martin 2005, 342) in the case of Kebribeyah,
it is largely because of the modalities of funding streams which make it difficult to take make this
transition into development. UNHCR receives the bulk of its funding from donors during the emergency
phase of an operation. Items such as food, tents and medicines are prioritized. But as the average
duration an individual is a refugee has increased from 9 years in 1993 to 17 years in 2003 (UNHCR 2003),
there is a need to rethink donor aid so that it is not focused on the emergency phase alone.
With an understanding that refugee camps are not spaces detached of their surroundings, but
rather, key nodes in the surrounding communities' livelihoods, a degree of dependence quickly forms on
the resources provided by the camps. This situation of dependency is further pronounced as a situation
becomes increasingly protracted. Therefore, if donors are willing to earmark a certain proportion of
their budget towards local community development or institutional capacity building, UNHCR will be
required to implement it. Generally, it is not a lack of will on the part of UNHCR to engage the local
community, but rather a lack of time, personnel and general lack of requirement to do so-and more
importantly, a lack of donor funding to carry out such programming. Thus, similar to the ways in which
certain donors require that a proportion of their contributions to UNHCR be allocated towards gender
programming, a similar portion could be allocated towards local community/institutional
development-particularly as a means to ensure that initial donor investments used towards
construction of the JVWS will have lasting impacts into future. As so common in development with
water infrastructure falling into disrepair once the implementer pulls out, one would hope the same
would not happen in the case of the JVWS.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
The difficulties of water management in refugee situations is clearly stated in the UNHCR
Handbook on Emergencies when it notes, "The availability of an adequate amount of water on a year-
round basis has proved in practice to be the single most important criterion, and commonly the most
problematic." (UNHCR 2007, 210) To that end, this thesis investigates the difficulties associated with
water management handovers-from a UN agency to a local community. The altercation mentioned in
Chapter 1 is only the first in a series of conflicts detailed within this thesis and sheds light on the fact
that blame should not be placed on the wrong-doing of a certain few. Rather, the fundamental
problems are based in the fact that the difficulties of transitioning from an emergency relief to
development framework is largely constrained by the dependencies and inter-dependencies which form
on the continued presence of UNHCR.
While UNHCR's Statute mandates the agency to have refugee protection as its guiding premise,
increasingly protracted situations and the concentration of key assets found in refugee camps brings the
local community into the realm of UNHCR's daily operations--whether to agency intends to or not. In
the case of Kebribeyah, the Jerer Valley Water System (JVWS) is an example of one such resource which
ties together local, regional, national and international actors and their collective reliance on each
other-for reasons of sovereignty, funding and capacity-makes it all the more difficult as UNHCR seeks
to pass on responsibility of the water system on to the local utility.
Sovereignty has proven to be a significant factor in not only siting camps, but also when UNHCR
seeks to pull out. And as Kebribeyah-and many refugee camps for that matter-function as semi-
autonomous spaces which inadvertently become key components of the daily livelihoods of the
surrounding local communities (especially as the duration of a refugee presence becomes increasingly
protracted) it is important to account for the dependence which forms on these camps and implement
measures early on to build local institutional capacity so that local survival is not completely hinged on
UNHCR.
Building local institutional capacity is much easier said than done. It takes an incredible amount
of personnel, time and most importantly, money. Understanding the very real impact an influx of
refugee aid and the construction of refugee camps have on localities is therefore important as it makes a
strong case for inclusion of local communities in donor support of refugee emergencies.
This thesis does not aim to simply identify the shortfalls in management of the JVWS, but seeks
to offer possible ways of rethinking refugee camp planning. And what is ultimately concluded is that
refugee camps are not spaces onto themselves. While as outsiders our focus may be on those displaced,
there is a need for equal amount of attention paid to those who host as well. And while some may note
that UNHCR is not a development agency, the fact of the matter is that by circumstance it is-even
when it chooses not to be. Accepting this reality-and receiving the added support from the
international aid community-will ultimately enable the agency to address this very real issue which
deserves addressing. This is but one modest opinion of a young Master's student.
Some possible steps forward, which serve more as an exercise to rethink certain themes within
UNHCR's work are as follow:
1. Funding: Donor funding can be reworked so that local community development (which would include
institutional development and not just infrastructural development in itself) is taken into
account. While UNHCR receives the majority of its funding during an emergency, by understanding that
many times refugee situations are increasingly protracted requires that the agency receive funds that
are earmarked towards long-term development, operations and maintenance. This is an inherent
challenge of international aid as many program officers note the relative ease in securing funding for
emergency provisions (food, water) or even built objects (water systems, schools, healthcare facilities),
but the relative difficulty in finding funding for softer items such as operations, maintenance and
capacity building. Thus, a self-imposed requirement by donors to earmark a certain proportion of their
funding to local capacity building as well as long-term maintenance and operations (as they do with
gender programming) will ensure that UNHCR can pursue such activities in the future.
2. Local Integration: Of the three durable solutions, two are more likely to be explored-repatriation or
resettlement. However, in the case of Kebribeyah it appears that the Somali refugees will not be
returning to Somalia anytime in the near future, and their inability to pass resettlement interviews to
the United States makes the prospects of their resettlement unlikely in the near future as
well. Generally, developed countries which have traditionally received resettlement are becoming
increasingly hesitant to accept refugees. Many of these countries also happen to be major donors to
UNHCR. It can therefore be within their interest to promote local integration of the refugees. However,
the Ethiopian government must ultimately agree to such an arrangement; and in the case of Kebribeyah
it is only if the local community's capacity to manage the water system exists and if the local community
is developed enough to absorb these refugees that the Ethiopian government may be willing to
naturalize these refugees.
3. Sovereignty: As the Ethiopian state is likely to be hesitant to grant citizenship to the Somali refugees
(due to the history of contested sovereignty within the region), UNHCR can better enable this by
ensuring that when the agency pull outs, the refugees will be self-sufficient (and serve as a major asset
to the local economy) and more importantly, the water system will be able to operate on its own. With
relation to the former, the refugees already are an asset to the local community as their ties to
Somaliland have made them key traders in supply chains connecting Addis to the international ports in
Berbera, Somaliland. Ethiopia's reliance on Somaliland's ports for import-export continues as the border
with Eritrea is now closed. However, with relation to the water system, the Ethiopian government
understands that if UNHCR is to pullout, the system is likely to collapse. For this reason, the Ethiopian
government makes sure to keep the 8,000-odd refugees in Kebribeyah to ensure that UNCHR has a
continued presence in the camp (thereby requiring the agency to continue supporting the system's
operations). Again, a likely way UNHCR can pullout is if the Ethiopian government (and local
community) sees it within their interest to take on full management of the water system. Doing so
requires building of local institutional capacity.
4. Legacy: UNHCR staff repeatedly mentioned that they aim to leave behind a positive legacy after their
pullout-a key objective of UNHCR operations globally. Doing so generally entails the provision of
lasting benefits (infrastructural and / or programmatic) to the local community, which help leave behind
a feeling hosting refugees proved advantageous. Such a sentiment is important if in the future UNHCR
seeks to reopen a camp or restart operations in the region. However, to leave behind a genuinely
positive legacy, UNHCR (and the emergency aid that they bring) should be perceived as an agency who
brought meaningful development to the local community. A component of this is local capacity
building. Once again, to play off this image of a glass half full, UNHCR has done a great deal in
developing infrastructure for local communities; but there nevertheless is an additional step it can take
to ensure that all these investments last into the future-even after the pullout. A number of UNHCR
staff noted that when camp operations end, the infrastructure is has developed fails and generally falls
into disrepair. More scholarship and evaluation of host communities after a refugee camp has closed
and the infrastructure that has been passed on can be incredibly useful in identifying what factors
contributed to successful handovers rather than just the countless stories of failure.
5. Space: Consideration should be given to placing camps in areas where local capacity already
exists. While many times the areas that are most capable of absorbing refugees, also happen to be the
ones most unwilling to do so, UNHCR can take this model of floating incentives to urban areas. In an
interview with Karen Jacobsen, she notes that infrastructure built in refugee camps is more likely to be
taken over by the local government where the capacity already exists (ex. Accra, Ghana). Therefore in
the Somali Regional context, for example, a camp (and water system) placed within close proximity of
Jijiga (for example) could have enabled a more likely chance of absorption of the infrastructure by the
local water utility-JWSO-which already is the capable agency responsible for maintenance and repair
of the Jerer Valley Water System. This however, requires negotiations over the territorial sovereignty of
the Ethiopian state and therefore would require that in future instances, the Ethiopian state needs to be
convinced that it is more advantageous for the country's long-term prospects if camps (and their
infrastructure) are placed closer to urban areas (where many times the capacity exists to take on
management). While it is currently too late to change the location of Kebribeyah, consideration can be
given to place camps closer to urban areas in the future.
Abbreviations
ARRA - Ethiopia Administration of Refugee and Returnee Affairs
E. coli - Escherichia coli
Km - kilometers
KWD - Kebribeyah Water Desk
JVWS - Jerer Valley Water System
IP - Implementing Partner
IRC - International Rescue Committee
LWF - Lutheran World Federation
MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology
NGO - Non-governmental Organization
OAU - Organization of African Unity
ONLF - Ogaden National Liberation Front
PHRJ - Program on Human Rights and Justice
PSC - Public Service Center
SNM - National Somali Movement
SPM - Somali Patriotic Movement
U5 diarrhea - diarrhea in children under five years of age
UN - United Nations
UNF -The United Nations Foundation
UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USC - United Somali Congress
WSLF - Western Somali Liberation Front
Glossary of Foreign Words
birka - an open and unprotected rainwater harvesting reservoir
birr- Ethiopian currency, with 1 Ethiopia Birr amounting to US $0.046 in June 2010
kebele - a neighborhood association, which is the smallest unit of local governance in Ethiopia.
Ogaden - a territory in the eastern portions of the Somali Region of Ethiopia, contested by the Ethiopian
state and Somali irredentist/separatist fighters.
woreda - a governmental management unit equivalent to a district. A woreda is comprised of a
collection of kebeles.
Appendices
Appendix 1: Methodology
The initial premise of the study and my responsibilities with UNHCR involved drinking water
quality testing. This thesis is an outgrowth of the original plan to test water quality in four UNHCR
refugee camps (AwBarre, Kebribeyah, Sherkole and Shimelba) throughout Ethiopia. A total of 120
samples were collected and tested from the four camps. Samples were drawn from 15 reservoirs and
alternative water sources (i.e. birkas and hand dug wells), 24 tap stands and 81 household storage units
comprised the bulk of the study. In each camp, the aim of the study was to find potential sources of
fecal contamination within the water supply and to deduce whether the contamination point is at the
treatment facility, water tap and/or household levels.
Water samples were collected from Kebribeyah Camp on June 18, 19 and 23 2010. Water
quality testing involved usage of E.C. Kits, which test for both total coliform bacteria and E.coli-a
specific strain of thermotolerant coliform bacteria. Presence of total coliform bacteria indicates
environmental contamination (i.e. soil and/or vegetation) and is generally harmless. While it is optimal
to detect no total coliform bacteria within drinking water samples, the specific strain of total coliform
bacteria which draws special concern is thermotolerant coliform bacteria. A sub-group of
thermotolerant bacteria is E.coli-an indicator of human and animal faecal contamination.
According to the World Health Organization guideline for E.coli: "E.coli or thermotolerant
coliform bacteria must not be detected in any 100 milliliter sample for all water directly intended for
drinking, water entering the distribution system or treated water in the distribution system." (WHO,
2004) Thus, any results from this study with either Intermediate, High or Very High levels of E. coli
should be taken into serious consideration. The risk levels and interpretation guide are detailed in the
table below, with all testing data gathered from the study detailed in Annex 3.
Inepetto Gud of Wae Quait Ris Leel bae upo Prsec of E.O 0 - . 0
Risk Level Categories EC Kits Results - E. coil
(World Health Organization, 1997) (Metcalf, 2006)
Risk Level E. coli sample (cfu*/100 ml) Colilert E. coli Result Petrifilm E. coli Result
Conformity < 1 Absent (no florescence) 0
Low 1-10 Absent (no florescence) 0
Intermediate 10-100 Present (blue florescence) 0
High 100-1000 Present (blue florescence) 1-10 (blue with gasbubbles count)
Very High >1000 Present (blue florescence) >10 (blue with gasbubbles count)
* cfu is a colony forming unit
During all site visits to Kebribeyah, a translator assisted in the process, by translating
information shared by refugees regarding when and from where the water in their household storage
unit was collected. Site visits were conducted with accompaniment of an ARRA officer, UNHCR Field
Staff and/or a UNHCR translator to detail the water system and translate questions directed to and
concerns raised by the refugees. When tapstand attendants were available, more in depth open-ended,
semi-structured interviews were carried out to gather information related to frequency and quantity of
the water supply, as well as usage of the tapstand by the refugee community. Water-related conflicts
amongst refugees and between refugees and the local community were also discussed.
During collection of water samples from household storage units, refugees were explicitly asked
whether the water being drawn was meant for drinking as well as other questions related to regularity
of the water supply, personal hygiene, latrine usage, availability of soap and disinfectants, maintenance
of household storage units as well as water-related conflicts and the history of development in the camp.
Discussions with in-field medical staff further contextualized the public health situation in the camps,
with insights provided regarding personal hygiene and the frequency of diarrhea amongst the
population.
Issues related to local history, conflict, on-site management and operations as well as inter-
institutional coordination were discussed in semi-structured informational interviews with UNHCR Sub-
Office Staff as well as the many drivers and translators who hold an incredible institutional memory
beyond most others in the field. UNHCR Addis Ababa Head Office Staff were also interviewed
......... .
throughout my stay in Ethiopia from June -August 2010 to delineate the planning history and
motivations behind JVWS, inter-institutional coordination and comparisons with other refugee camps in
Ethiopia. Correspondence with UNHCR Headquarter staff in Geneva and academics of refugee studies
provided comparisons with other refugee camps worldwide, as well as insights related to international
foreign aid, UNHCR pull outs and infrastructural handovers.
Limitations in the methodology involve the research design of the water quality testing. As tap
stands were not consistently tested over a more extended period of time within the refugee camp, the
study cannot definitively state that the reasons for degraded water quality drawn from tapstands are
due to a structural error (i.e. a break in the pipe infrastructure). Conducting a comprehensive water
quality assessment of all tapstands would determine if fecal contamination is caused by either (a)
improperly applied chlorine at the treatment facility and/or (b) a break in the pipe infrastructure.
Nevertheless, Chapter 2 details how the variation in quality of water found from the same tap stands on
different days would suggest insufficient amounts of chlorine applied at the treatment facility. Also, the
intermittent water supply is a strong indicator of a management shortfall; while pressure variations and
breaks in the piped infrastructure are possible explanations for inconsistency, these possibilities have
largely been ruled out as tap stand attendants and refugee users repeatedly mentioned the extreme
variation in flowing water outflows from tap stands-without any discernible pattern in inconsistency.
Another limitation involves the fact that while both UNHCR staff and refugees were interviewed,
JWSO and KWD staff members were not. A combination of language barrier and unavailability of staff
for interviews during the field visit have made this difficult to execute. However, as staff turnovers
regularly occur within an 8-12 month cycle, many JWSO and KWD staff lack the institutional memory
needed for this study. Nevertheless, future studies on Kebribeyah should certainly make a concerted
effort to include JWSO and KWD staff perspectives as well.
Number of Tap Tap in Tap in Tap Outside Protected Unprotected River/Lake/Population Housing Inside % Compound % Compound % Compound % Well or % Well or % Pond 
Area Units House (Private) Shared Spring Spring
Ethiopia 73,750,932 15,103,134 144,040 0.95% 465,298 3.08% 820,504 5.43% 2,909,899 19.27% 2,527,493 16.73% 4,217,933 27.93% 4,017,967 26.60%
Ethiopia urban 11,862,821 2,897,018 98,189 3.39% 444,828 15.35% 723,672 24.98% 1,215,095 41.94% 172,285 5.95% 134,097 4.63% 108,852 3.76%
Ethiopia rural 61,888,111 12,206,116 45,851 0.38% 20,470 0.17% 96,832 0.79% 1,694,804 13.88% 2,355,208 19.30% 4,083,836 33.46% 3,909,115 32.03%
Somali Region 4,445,219 648,541 7,131 1.10% 4,416 0.68% 10,814 1.67% 55,429 8.55% 92,704 14.29% 234,493 36.16% 243,554 37.55%
Somali region urban 623,004 91,242 2,651 2.91% 3,762 4.12% 7,083 7.76% 29,610 32.45% 10,991 12.05% 13,740 15.06% 23,405 25.65%
Somali region rural 3,822,215 557,299 4,480 0.80% 654 0.12% 3,731 0.67% 25,819 4.63% 81,713 14.66% 220,753 39.61% 220,149 39.50%
Jijiga Zone 967,652 145,339 2,132 1.47% 2,410 1.66% 4,956 3.41% 19,794 13.62% 30,886 21.25% 56,898 39.15% 28,263 19.45%
Jijiga Zone Urban 203,588 34,628 1,215 3.51% 2,353 6.80% 4,587 13.25% 16,521 47.71% 4,196 12.12% 3,456 9.98% 2,300 6.64%
Jijiga Zone Rural 764,064 110,711 917 0.83% S7 0.05% 369 0.33% 3,273 2.96% 26,690 24.11% 53,442 48.27% 25,963 23.45%
Jijiga Woreda 277,560 42,771 1,109 2.59% 2,140 5.00% 4,158 9.72% 15,547 36.35% 5,996 14.02% 9,238 21.60% 4,583 10.72%
Jijiga Woreda Urban 125,876 23,264 959 4.12% 2,122 9.12% 3,996 17.18% 14,049 60.39% 964 4.14% 797 3.43% 377 1.62%
Jijiga Woreda Rural 151,684 19,507 150 0.77% 18 0.09% 162 0.83% 1,498 7.68% 5,032 25.80% 8,441 43.27% 4,206 21.56%
Kebribeyah Woreda 165,518 25,484 262 1.03% 72 0.28% 271 1.06% 1,670 6,55% 6,743 26.46% 8,933 35.05% 7,533 29.56%
Kebribeyah urban 25,493 4,128 73 1.77% 66 1.60% 232 5.62% 1,274 30.86% 713 17.27% 852 20.64% 912 22.09%
Kebribeyah rural 140,025 21,362 189 0.88% 6 0.00% 39 0.18% 396 1.85% 6,030 28.23% 8,081 37.83% 6,621 30.99%
Appendix 3: Water Quality Data of Four Refugee Camps: AwBarre, Kebribeyah, Sherkole and Shimelba
Abbreviations:
ADD: Addis Ababa UNHCR Compound
AWB: AwBarre Refugee Camp
H: House
KBR: Kebribeyah Refugee Camp
N: No
S: Section
SHK: Sherkole Refugee Camp
SHM: Shimelba Refugee Camp
TMTC: Too many to count (>100
Y: Yes
Z: Zone
colonies with gas bubbles)
Colilert Results Petrifilm Results
# Collection Camp Source Yellow #of Blue Total Comments WHO Risk Level
ID Date Coloring Flourescence? colonies w/ Colonies for E.coli
(Y/N) (Y/N) Gas Bubbles Bub les
UNHCR
1 1-Jun-10 ADD Tap N N 0 0 Conformity/Low
Bottled
2 1-Jun-10 ADD Water N N 0 0 Conformity/Low
UNHCR
3 1-Jun-10 ADD Puddle Y Y 0 90+ Intermediate
Tap
Stand
(Zone 3
Section 2
House w/ sodium
4 18-Jun-10 KBR 136) Y Y 0 1 thiosulfate Intermediate
Tap
Stand
(Zone 3
Section 2
House w/o sodium
5 18-Jun-10 KBR 136) Y N 0 1 thiosulfate Conformity/Low
Tap
Stand
(Zone 4
Section 2
House w/o sodium
6 19-Jun-10 KBR 45) Y N 0 11 thiosulfate Conformity/Low
water
collected
Jerrycan from water
(Z4S2 point (19-
7 19-Jun-10 KBR H1) Y N 0 1 Jun-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected
Jerrycan from water
(Z4 S2 point (18-
8 19-Jun-10 KBR H2) Y N 0 9 Jun-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected
Jerrycan from water
(Z4 S2 point (18-
9 19-Jun-10 KBR H3) Y y 1 21 Jun-10) High
Colilert Results Petrifilm Results
#t of
# Collection Total WHO Risk Level
ID Date Camp Source Yellow Flourescence? Blue Colonies Comments for E.coliColoring (Y/N) Colonies w/ Gas(Y/N) w/ Gas Bubbles
Bubbles
claimed used
for drinking
10 19-Jun-10 KBR Birka (Z4 S2) Y Y 0 12 water Intermediate
water
collected
from birka
(claimed the
Jerrycan (Z3 water tap was
11 19-Jun-10 KBR S2 H164) Y N 0 9 not working) Conformity/Low
water
collected
from water
Bucket (Z3 S1 point (18-Jun-
12 19-Jun-10 KBR H25) Y Y 10 96 10) High
water
collected
from water
Jerrycan (Z3 point (17-Jun-
13 19-Jun-10 KBR S1 H1) Y Y 0 6 10) Intermediate
functioning
for the 5
Tap Stand(Z2 minutes I was
14 19-Jun-10 KBR S1 H67) Y N 0 1 present Conformity/Low
water
collected
from water
Jerrycan (Z2 point (18-Jun-
15 19-Jun-10 KBR 51 H67) Y Y 0 22 10) Intermediate
water from
Waterbottle jerrycan (19-
16 19-Jun-10 KBR (Z2 S1) Y Y 0 46 Jun-10) Intermediate
water
collected
Jerrycan with from water
leaves (Z1 S1 point(18-Jun-
17 19-Jun-10 KBR H131) Y Y 0 TMTC 10) Intermediate
water
collected
from water
Jerrycan (Z1 point (16-Jun-
18 19-Jun-10 KBR S1 H146) Y Y 0 14 10) Intermediate
water
collected
from water
Jerrycan (Z1 point (16-Jun-
19 19-Jun-10 KBR S1 H150) Y Y 0 17 10) Intermediate
water
collected
from water
Jerrycan (Z1 point (18-Jun-
20 19-Jun-10 KBR S1 H159) Y N 0 7 10) Conformity/Low
AwBarre
21 21-Jun-10 AWB Reservoir N N 0 0 Conformity/Low
Tap Stand 1
(Zone 1 Block
22 21-Jun-10 AWB 16 House 1) N N 0 0 Conformity/Low
Colilert Results Petrifilm Results
# Collection # of Total WHO Risk Level
ID Date Camp Source Yellow Flourescence? Blue Colonies Comments for E.coliColoring (Y/N) Colonies w/ Gas(Y/N) w/ Gas BubblesBubbles
Plastic water
Storage collected from
Tank (Z1 Waterpoint 1
23 21-Jun-10 AWB B12 H7) N N 0 0 (20-Jun-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z1 Waterpoint 1
24 21-Jun-10 AWB B16 H2) Y N 0 0 (20-Jun-10) Conformity/Low
Tap Stand 5
25 21-Jun-10 AWB (Z2) Y N 0 0 Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z2 Waterpoint 5
26 21-Jun-10 AWB 16 Hi) Y Y 1 2 (20-Jun-10) High
Plastic water
Storage collected from
Tank (Z2 Waterpoint 5
27 21-Jun-10 AWB B14 H16) Y Y 0 0 (20-Jun-10) Intermediate
Tap Stand
28 21-Jun-10 AWB 22 (Z3) Y N 0 0 Conformity/Low
water
Self-bought collected from
Jerrycan (Z1 Waterpoint 22
29 21-Jun-10 AWB B57 H5) Y Y 0 0 (20-Jun-10) Intermediate
water
Used Diesel collected from
Jerrytan (Z1 Waterpoint 22
30 21-Jun-10 AWB B59 H4) Y Y 2 3 (20-Jun-10) High
all samples
Zone 4 collected with
Water Point sodium
31 23-Jun-10 KBR (Z4 S1 H38) Y Y 0 1 thiosulfate Intermediate
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z4 Z4 waterpoint
32 23-Jun-10 KBR S1 H38) Y Y 2 17 (23-Jun-10) High
water
UNHCR collected from
Jerrycan (Z4 Z4 waterpoint
33 23-Jun-10 KBR S1 H62) Y N 0 7 (22-Jun-10) Conformity/Low
water
Year-old collected from
Jerrycan (Z4 Z4 waterpoint
34 23-Jun-10 KBR S1 H60) Y Y 1 24 (23-Jun-10) High
Zone 3
Water Point
35 23-Jun-10 KBR (Z3 S2 H72) Y Y 2 11 High
Colilert Results Petrifilm Results
#f of
# Collection Total WHO Risk Level
ID Date Camp Source Yellow Flourescence? Blue Colonies Comments for E.coliColoring (Y/N) Colonies w/ Gas
(Y/N) w/ Gas Bubbles
Bubbles
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z3 Z3 waterpoint
36 23-Jun-10 KBR S1 H56) Y Y 0 8 (23-Jun-10) Intermediate
water
Used Oil collected from
Container Z3 waterpoint
37 23-Jun-10 KBR (Z3 S3 H249) Y Y 1 6 (23-Jun-10) High
water
UNHCR collected from
Jerrycan (Z3 Z3 waterpoint
38 23-Jun-10 KBR 53 H66) Y Y 1 3 (22-Jun-10) High
water
50-litre collected from
Jerrycan (Z3 Z3 waterpoint
39 23-Jun-10 KBR S4 H133) Y Y 2 3 (22-Jun-10) High
Zone 2 Tap
Stand (Z2 S1
40 23-Jun-10 KBR H5) Y Y 0 1 Intermediate
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z2 Z2 waterpoint
41 23-Jun-10 KBR S1 H5) Y N 0 TMTC (22-Jun-10) Conformity/Low
water
Jerrycan (Z2 collected from
S1 no House Z2 waterpoint
42 23-Jun-10 KBR #) Y Y 0 3 (22-Jun-10) Intermediate
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z2 Z2 waterpoint
43 23-Jun-10 KBR S1 H4) Y Y 0 17 (22-Jun-10) Intermediate
Zone 1Tap
Stand (Z2 S2
44 23-Jun-10 KBR H67) Y Y 1 3 High
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z2 Z1 waterpoint
45 23-Jun-10 KBR S2 H204) Y N 0 3 (22-Jun-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z1 ZI waterpoint
46 23-Jun-10 KBR S1 H75) Y N 0 13 (22-Jun-10) Conformity/Low
Colilert Results Petrifilm Results
# Collection # of Total WHO Risk Level
ID Date Camp Source Yellow Flouescence? C e Colonies Comments for E.coliColoing (YIN) Colonies w a(Y/N) w/ Gas Bubbles
Bubbles
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z1 Z1 waterpoint
47 23-Jun-10 KBR SI H175) Y N 0 20 (22-Jun-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z1 Z1 waterpoint
48 23-Jun-10 KBR S1 H182) Y Y TMTC TMTC (22-Jun-10) Very High
new Zone 1
Tap Stand
49 23-Jun-10 KBR (Z2 S1 H88) Y Y 1 1 High
water
collected from
new Z1
Jerrycan (Z2 Waterpoint
50 23-Jun-10 KBR S1 H74) y y 0 0 (22-Jun-10) Intermediate
Birka (Z1
along the
51 23-Jun-10 KBR road) Y y 0 42 Intermediate
all samples
from 52-91
collected with
Reservoir 2 sodium
52 19-Jul-10 SHM (inlet) N N '0 0 thiosulfate Conformity/Low
Reservoir 2
53 19-Jul-10 SHM (outlet) N N 0 0 Conformity/Low
Reservoir 3
54 19-Jul-10 SHM (outlet) N N 0 0 Conformity/Low
Handdug
55 19-Jul-10 SHM Well 1 Y Y 0 11 Intermediate
56 19-Jul-10 SHM Tapstand 1 N N 0 0 Conformity/Low
57 19-Jul-10 SHM Tapstand 3 N N 0 0 - Conformity/Low
58 19-Jul-10 SHM Tapstand 6 N N 0 0 Conformity/Low
59 19-Jul-10 SHM Tapstand 7 N N 0 0 Conformity/Low
60 19-Jul-10 SHM Tapstand 9 Y N 0 1 Conformity/Low
61 19-Jul-10 SHM Tapstand 11 Y N 0 0 Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z1 . Tapstand 1
62 20-Jul-10 SHM B3 H2) y N 0 12 (19-Jul-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z1 Tapstand 1
63 20-Jul-10 SHM B3 H3) N N 0 0 (19-Jul-10) Conformity/Low
Colilert Results Petrifilm Results
# of
# Collection Blu Total WHO Risk Level
ID Date Camp Source Yellow Flourescence? Blue Colonies Comments for E coliColoring (YN) Colonies w/ Gas(Y/N) w/ Gas wubbas
Bubbles Bubbles
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z1 Tapstand 1
64 20-Jul-10 SHM B12 H14) Y Y 6 15 (19-Jul-10) Intermediate
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z1 Tapstand 1
65 20-Jul-10 SHM B7 H1) Y N 0 0 (19-Jul-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Zi Tapstand 1
66 20-Jul-10 SHM B7 H4) Y Y 1 17 (20-Jul-10) High
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z2 Tapstand 3
67 20-Jul-10 SHM B2 H13-B) Y Y 0 19 (20-Jul-10) Intermediate
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z2 Tapstand 2
68 20-Jul-10 SHM B2 H13-A) Y N 0 0 (19-Jul-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z2 Tapstand 3
69 20-Jul-10 SHM B8 H9) Y Y 0 11 (20-Jul-10) Intermediate
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z2 Tapstand 3
70 20-Jul-10 SHM B8 H1) N N 0 0 (19-Jul-10) Conformity/Low
Plastic water
Storage collected from
Tank (Z2 B7 Tapstand 3
71 20-Jul-10 SHM H9) Y N 0 TMTC (19-Jul-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z4 Tapstand 11
72 20-Jul-10 SHM B21 H14) Y N 0 1 (20-Jul-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z4 Tapstand 11
73 20-Jul-10 SHM B13 H7) Y N 1 2 (19-Jul-10) High
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z4 Tapstand 11
74 20-Jul-10 SHM B14 H6) y N 0 2 (19-Jul-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z4 Tapstand 11
75 20-Jul-10 SHM B15 H12) N N 0 0 (20-Jul-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z4 Tapstand 11
76 20-Jul-10 SHM B21 H21) y N 0 12 (19-Jul-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z5 Tap Stand 6
77 20-Jul-10 SHM B4 H20) N N 0 0 (20-Jul-10) Conformity/Low
Colilert Results Petrifilm Results
# of# Collection C Sl Total WHO Risk Level
ID Date Coloring Flourescence? olonies Colonies Comments for E.coli
(Y/N) (Y/N) w/ Gas w/ Gas
Bubbles Bubbles
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z5 Tap Stand 6
78 20-Jul-10 SHM B3 H23) N N 0 0 (19-Jul-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z5 Tap Stand 6
79 20-Jul-10 SHM B3 H23-B) Y N 0 0 (19-Jul-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z5 Tap Stand 6
80 20-Jul-10 SHM B3 H #) Y N 0 0 (20-Jul-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (ZS Tap Stand 6
81 20-Jul-10 SHM B3 H25) N N 0 0 (20-Jul-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z3 Tap Stand 7
82 20-Jul-10 SHM B6 H2) y N 0 TMTC (19-Jul-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z3 Tap Stand 7
83 20-Jul-10 SHM B2 H36) N N 0 0 (19-Jul-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z3 Tap Stand 7
84 20-Jul-10 SHM B2 H28) y N 0 2 (19-Jul-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z3 Tap Stand 7
85 20-Jul-10 SHM B2 H31) Y y 0 1 (19-Jul-10) Intermediate
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z3 Tap Stand 7
86 20-Jul-10 SHM B4 HI) Y Y 0 13 (20-Jul-10) Intermediate
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z4 Tap Stand 9
87 20-Jul-10 SHM B9 H3) N N 0 0 (19-Jul-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z4 Tap Stand 9
88 20-Jul-10 SHM B9 H1) N N 0 1 (19-Jul-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z4 Tap Stand 9
89 20-Jul-10 SHM B4 H17) Y Y 0 6 (19-Jul-10) Intermediate
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z4 Tap Stand 9
90 20-Jul-10 SHM B4 H34) Y N 0 0 (20-Jul-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan (Z4 Tap Stand 9
91 20-Jul-10 SHM B4 H16) Y y 5 10 (20-Jul-10) High
Colilert Results Petrifilm Results
#*of
# Collection aro Total WHO Risk Level
ID Date Coloring Flourescence? le Colonies Comments for E.coliCooig (YI N) Colonies w/ Gas(Y/N) w/ Gas w/bGas
Bubbles Bubbles
.5-.6 mg/I
chlorine
Reservoir 1 target upon
92 4-Aug-10 SHK (59 M3) N N 0 0 exit Conformity/Low
Tapstand
(Zone A
93 4-Aug-10 SHK Tapstand 1) N N 0 0 Conformity/Low
Tapstand
(Zone B
94 4-Aug-10 SHK Tapstand 1) N N 0 0 Conformity/Low
Tapstand
(Zone C
95 4-Aug-10 SHK Tapstand 1) N N 0 0 Conformity/Low
Tapstand
(Zone E
96 4-Aug-10 SHK Tapstand 1) N N 0 0 Conformity/Low
Tapstand
(Zone F
97 4-Aug-10 SHK Tapstand 1) N N 0 0 Conformity/Low
Tapstand
(Zone G
98 4-Aug-10 SHK Tapstand 1) N N 0 0 Conformity/Low
Handdug
Well 3 Darfurian
99 4-Aug-10 SHK (Zone A) Y Y 2 2 Christian zone High
Handdug
Well 6
100 4-Aug-10 SHK (Zone B) N N 0 0 Conformity/Low
Handdug
Well 1
(Zone C /
101 4-Aug-10 SHK Zone G) N N 0 0 Conformity/Low
Handdug Maban
Well (Zone (Sudanese)
102 4-Aug-10 SHK E) Y Y 1 9 zone High
water
Jerrycan collected
(Zone A from tap
Block 1 stand (4-Aug-
103 5-Aug-10 SHK House 8) N N 0 0 10) Conformity/Low
water
collected
from tap
Jerrycan stand (5-Aug-
104 5-Aug-10 SHK (ZA BI H3) N N 0 0 10) Conformity/Low
water
collected
from tap
Jerrycan stand (5-Aug-
105 5-Aug-10 SHK (ZA B2 H#) N N 0 0 10) Conformity/Low
water
collected
Open from tap
Bucket(ZA stand (5-Aug-
106 5-Aug-10 SHK B1 H3) Y Y 1 9 10) High
Colilert Results Petrifilm Results
# Collection # of Total WHO Risk Level
ID Date Camp Source Yellow Flourescence? le Colonies for E.coliColoring (Y/N) Colonies w a(Y/N) w/ Gas Bubbles
I Bubbles
water
collected from
Jerrycan tap stand (5-
107 5-Aug-10 SHK (ZB B1 H3) N N 0 0 Aug-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan tap stand (5-
108 5-Aug-10 SHK (ZB B2 H6) N N 0 0 Aug-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan tap stand (4-
109 5-Aug-10 SHK (ZB B2 H#) N N 0 0 Aug-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan tap stand (5-
110 5-Aug-10 SHK (ZC B1 H#) N N 0 0 Aug-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan tap stand (5-
111 5-Aug-10 SHK (ZC B1 H79) N N 0 0 Aug-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan Handdug well
112 5-Aug-10 SHK (ZC B3 H4) N N 0 0 (4-Aug-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan tap stand (5-
113 5-Aug-10 SHK (ZE B3 H#) N N 0 0 Aug-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan tap stand (5-
114 5-Aug-10 SHK (ZE B1 H1) N N 0 0 Aug-10) Conformity/Low
water
Jerrycan collected from
(ZF B2 tap stand (4-
115 5-Aug-10 SHK H312) N N 0 0 Aug-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan tap stand (5-
116 5-Aug-10 SHK (ZF B2 H22) N N 0 0 Aug-10) Conformity/Low
water
Jerrycan collected from
(ZF B2 tap stand (5-
117 5-Aug-10 SHK H213) N N 0 0 Aug-10) Conformity/Low
water
Jerrycan collected from
(ZG B2 tap stand (4-
118 5-Aug-10 SHK H19) N N 0 0 Aug-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan tap stand (5-
119 5-Aug-10 SHK (ZG B2 H#) N N 0 0 Aug-10) Conformity/Low
water
collected from
Jerrycan tap stand (4-
120 5-Aug-10 SHK (ZG B3 H9) N N 0 0 Aug-10) Conformity/Low
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